The assessment of ties between the United States and the Republic of Korea mirrors quite closely the levels of trust in the United States, with a 77-23% "strong-not too strong" balance here, and 72-28% positive-negative balance on trust. As we will see shortly, this linkage is probably closely tied to what our sample saw as the chief benefits to Korea of bilateral ties - security.

2. Major Beneficiary in the U.S.-ROK Relationship
"Who do you think benefits most from the relationship, the United States or the Republic of Korea?"

A clear majority was of the view that the United States benefits most from the bilateral ties, a view held unanimously by the military respondents, and more heavily than the norm by media persons. NGOs, women, and - interestingly - politicians felt that Korea was the principal beneficiary.

3. Principal Benefits to the Republic of Korea
Respondents were also asked to choose, from among four alternatives, the first and second most important benefits to the Republic of Korea of bilateral ties:

(*) "Presenting obvious goals and objectives as a leading country," and "pioneering and scientific-technical mind;" both volunteered.

The picture is crystal clear: security first, economics second, and everything trails far behind. Security was particularly important to members of the media; the third item, democratization and human rights, drew special notice from academics. The relatively high levels of trust that we noted for the United States, easily surpassing those recorded for China, Japan, and Russia, in that order, surely reflect the primary importance of the bilateral security relationship, a relationship that has endured for over half a century.

4. Major Problems in the Relationship
When respondents were asked to pinpoint, in their own words, what they thought were the most important problems in relations between Korea and the U.S., we found frequent concurrence on a number of telling items (some of which can also be heard from other, non-Korean, quarters):

• U.S. "hegemonism"
• excessive Korean dependency on the U.S.
• impact of the U.S. military presence
• American unilateralism, egoism, and attitude of superiority
• U.S. interventionism in Korea's internal affairs
• unfair U.S. trade conditions, and unequal economic status
• discrimination against Koreans
• "flunkeyism" of Korean government toward the U.S.
• anti-Americanism
• aggressive U.S. policies that heighten South-North tensions
• U.S. putting Japan ahead of Korea
• Korea just a member of Pax Americana
• cultural differences
• visa problems

This is a lengthy and powerful list of grievances. For anyone who has been involved in U.S.-Korean affairs over the years, these expressions of concern and thinly-disguised resentment cum anger will come as no surprise. The enormous American presence in the Republic of Korea, and the powerful impact that U.S. policy can have in Korean life, are bound to raise concerns among the Korean citizenry. Such a pointed catalog of complaints and even indictments represents a warning signal and call for attention that should not be lightly dismissed. The very fact that this catalog has endured over time makes it all the more disturbing.

5. Anti-Americanism: Levels and Danger
"In recent times, do think anti-Americanism has been:"

Half of our respondents see anti-Americanism as a growing phenomenon, with higher proportions among politicians and the military holding this opinion. At the same time, only one in four see such hostile views as dangerous to the bilateral relationship, with government and public officials among the least concerned:.

"How dangerous is anti-Americanism to ROK-U.S. relations?"

Reasons volunteered by respondents for the growth of anti-American feelings frequently parallel factors mentioned above as problems in the U.S.-Korean relationship:

• U.S. superpower attitude
• U.S. hegemonism
• arrogance in Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) negotiations
• self-centered, arrogant American attitudes; egoism
• unequal relationship
• "More and more Korean people feel uncomfortable with the arrogant behavior of the U.S. Army in Korea. To be a real ally with us, the U.S. should try to keep more equal and fair relations with Korea."
  
• hard-line Bush policy on North Korea

It is worth noting that events that have occurred since our interviewing took place have added to anti-American attitudes in the Republic of Korea. In particular, elements of the Korean mass media, as well as Internet-users, have been outspoken in their criticism of three developments:

• President Bush's use of the term "axis of evil," to include North Korea. Critics fault that phraseology, as damaging prospects for South-North dialogue;
  
• disqualification of the victorious Korean short-track speed skater at the Salt Lake City Winter Olympics, with his gold medal awarded to the American runner-up; and,
  
• talk-show host Jay Leno's unfortunate attempt at humor, saying that the Korean skater was so angered by his disqualification that, when he got home, he kicked his dog - and then ate it.
  

Overall, the range of negative views that we recorded is worrisome. It reflects a panorama of critical attitudes and perceptions that is clearly corrosive to the best interests of both sides. However benign the assessments may be of the potential danger that anti-Americanism poses to the relationship, the breadth of the spectrum of harsh judgements is worrisome. This is a subject that deserves close scrutiny, one that calls for continuing, as well as new and innovative, efforts to bridge some serious differences.

At the same time, one can ask whether it might be equally accurate to characterize current trends not so much in terms of "anti-Americanism," but rather as a decline in "pro-Americanism." As we will see below, Koreans find much that is positive in ties with the United States, and some of the complaints registered in our survey reflect natural differences in points of view. (Going to institutions of higher learning in the U.S. remains the dream of many young Koreans, just as it does for Chinese and Japanese.) As the relationship has matured, and as Korean self-confidence has grown, it has become increasingly acceptable - almost a matter of national pride - to speak up, and back, to the former "big brother." That can be healthy.

6. Security Issues

Against this backdrop, the primacy of security ties, noted earlier, appears to have its limits. Indeed, considerable caution and/or reluctance was expressed on several security-related matters, providing difficult challenges to the achievement of relevant U.S. policy objectives.

a. U.S. Missile Defense Program
"How do you feel about the U.S. missile defense program? Do you favor having the ROK participate in this, with missile defense facilities deployed on Korean soil, or are you opposed?"

This is a two-to-one majority in principal against Korean participation in the U.S. missile defense initiative. Even the military representatives were evenly divided. Responses from NGO representatives and women were unanimous in opposition. Excluding the "don't know" category, so too were the politicians.

We cannot tell from these responses how firm the opposition is to placing missile defense facilities in the Republic of Korea. But the clearly negative balance points to an uphill battle for the Bush Administration, as it seeks to deploy a missile defense shield. A great deal of convincing will be required to overcome such widespread skepticism about this program. On one hand, that skepticism could be sharply reduced if North Korea resumes its own missile testing program. On the other hand, as already noted, reports from Korea suggest that opposition has been exacerbated by displeasure with President Bush's inclusion of North Korea in the "axis of evil."

There is also a difference in interpretation of the nature of the threat that North Korea presents. For policy makers in Seoul, the danger of Kim Jong-il is primarily regional, with his nascent missile delivery capability carrying the potential of turning Seoul into "a sea of fire." (Japan also is more inclined to view the problem in this light.) For Washington, on the other hand, the issue is global, confronting the reclusive North Korean leader involved in the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and looking at possible ties with international terrorism. How Korean views will ultimately sort themselves out on positioning of an anti-missile defense shield on Korea soil will be shaped by events yet to unfold.

b. Post-Unification U.S. Force Levels in Korea
"When Korea is unified, do you think the level of U.S. military forces should:"

Not unexpectedly, military respondents were the least supportive of rapid reductions in U.S. forces, joined by members of the media: both were unanimous in wanting the U.S. presence either to remain the same, or be reduced gradually. Politicians and NGO officials, on the other hand, favored quick or total reduction of U.S. military forces. The majority support for gradual reduction reflects the pragmatic caution we have noted elsewhere, permitting time for any necessary reevaluation.

Any discussion of the U.S. force presence is complicated by the contentious problem of the location of those forces, especially the huge 8th Army complex in the Yongsan compound in Seoul. What used to be an establishment on the edge of the city limits now occupies a prize piece of downtown real estate in the nation's capitol. Its market value is enormous; so are the costs of relocation. Proposed new housing construction heightens the already testy mood over this prime piece of land.

c. Korean Support for War on Terrorism.
Respondents were asked to choose between three levels of possible support the Republic of Korea might provide "in what President Bush calls a war on terrorism:"

As might be expected, the first alternative, "full support," found most favor among the military. Academics were unanimous in favor of "limited support," which excluded military action. And one NGO member in three, joined by one politician in four, favored "no support."

This is, on balance, a substantial vote for restrained engagement in the Bush anti-terrorism campaign. As noted above in the case of majority opposition to stationing missile defense facilities on Korea soil, one can speculate that this reluctance will be strengthened by President Bush's lumping North Korea, Iran, and Iraq into an "axis of terror" in his State of the Union speech. Continuing reaction in the South Korean media to those remarks has been outspoken, with most of it vehemently critical.