

Beyond the New Order: Decentralization's Effect on Communities in Indonesia

17 June 2002

WRITTEN BY

Wendy M. Ames, *Rapporteur*

IN COOPERATION WITH

Allen Thayer

Program Officer for Southeast Asia Programs

Shyama Venkateswar

Associate Director, Asian Social Issues Program



Major funding for the symposium and this report was provided by the Open Society Institute, Ford Foundation, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Sasakawa Peace Foundation-USA and the Himalaya Foundation.

Remarks quoted throughout this report are from various symposium participants

The opinions expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent the views of the Asia Society or its funders.

Table of Contents

| | |
|--|----|
| Executive Summary | 1 |
| Introduction to Indonesia | 3 |
| Decentralizing a Corrupt and Weak State | 6 |
| Regional Conflict and the Indonesian Military (TNI/ABRI) | 9 |
| Islam | 11 |
| Environmental Costs | 12 |
| The Indonesian Economy and Business | 13 |
| International Responsibility | 15 |
| Conclusion - Looking Forward | 17 |
| Addenda | 18 |
| Agenda | 18 |
| Further Reading | 20 |
| Further Reading Online | 21 |



Executive Summary

One of the biggest institutional challenges facing Indonesia in the post-Suharto, post-New Order era is the issue of decentralization of the state (or *regional autonomy* as the process is more commonly known in Indonesia). This report draws from presentations made at the symposium, “Beyond the New Order: Decentralization’s Effect on Communities in Indonesia,” held on 17 June 2002, at the Asia Society—New York. The symposium, co-sponsored by the Asia Society and the Open Society Institute, brought together speakers and a participatory audience of international and indigenous academics, activists, NGO practitioners, journalists and policy-makers. Participants explored the socio-cultural nexus of conflict, communities and government throughout the Indonesian archipelago, and discussed the constructive ways in which the international community might be involved. The Indonesia symposium was the third event in a series entitled “Communities in Conflict” organized by the Asia Society’s Asian Social Issues Program (ASIP). The first two events explored relevant issues on strengthening civil society, conflict resolution and democratic participation in Sri Lanka (2000) and Afghanistan (2001).

The symposium underscored many important questions that continue to linger around the concept of successful and sustainable decentralization of the Indonesian government: What have been the major social costs of the various and protracted conflicts? How have the local community groups responded to these costs? What are the strategies to expand civil society in Indonesia? Have the recent autonomy laws changed

Major Issues Highlighted at the Symposium on Decentralization:

Corruption and a Weak State

Corruption and the impunity of human rights violators must end in Indonesia. Bridges must be built between informal and formal institutions, local and national governments in an across-the-board campaign to eliminate corruption and put an end to impunity. Strengthening of the judicial, legal and security systems can serve as an impetus behind conflict-resolution and the restoration of trust among the Indonesian people.

Regional Conflict

Conflict prevention, trauma healing, truth and the restoration of cultural dignity must be addressed in a manner that is contextually appropriate and sustainable.

Indonesian Military

The Indonesian military (TNI) can be reformed through constructive engagement with the Indonesian government and various international actors.

Social and Environmental Costs

The decentralization process must look beyond the concerns of Jakarta in an attempt to understand the local and national ramifications of its implementation. Decentralization has social costs and consequences, environmental degradation being the most evident.

Economics and Business

The short-term outlook for Indonesia's economic future is grim. The international financial community could be critical in turning this around.

the dynamic between the center and the peripheries? Have these laws led to greater decentralization of decision-making and participation from local groups? Will these new structures help to mitigate potential future conflicts? What are some constructive roles for the United States, the United Nations and other international organizations and NGOs to play in these crises?

To answer these questions, the reorganization of the Indonesian state must be put in its proper context. The fall of President Suharto's New Order military regime in 1998 sparked a desire to return sovereignty to the people, and to allow them to have control of both their leadership and their resources. Ironically though, decentralization in Indonesia has been greatly complicated by the fact that it was introduced during this time of severe social, political and economic strife. Legal reform, good governance initiatives, attempts at a civilian control of military and police, the separation of these two forces, democratization, the Asian economic crisis, environmental degradation and the struggle for political power at the local and national level cause and work to define the regional conflicts throughout the archipelago, and as such make decentralization an incredibly daunting task. The official fragmentation of Indonesia over the past few years through a rapid creation of new regions and provinces (some of which are drawn along ethnic lines) has caused additional debate.

The current Indonesian President, Megawati Sukarnoputri, has neither been overly supportive of decentralization nor particularly opposed to the policy. Aside from President Habibie, who initiated the decentralization process, neither of Indonesia's subsequent presidents have been wholly committed to the project. The benign neglect to this seemingly crucial policy stems from two major factors. First, the numerous ongoing economic, political and humanitarian conflicts raging throughout the archipelago make it difficult and politically less rewarding to focus on the much-needed yet tedious details of preparing the country for successful decentralization. Second, Jakarta-based politicians and military leaders have an obvious aversion to implementing a policy that many of them see as being mandated from above by international agencies like the World Bank and the IMF. There are few rational objections to the policy, however many irrational players are doing their best to slow, if not retard, the process of decentralization. This attitude brings to mind several questions about the nature of Indonesia's recent "democratization." If judicial and legal systems are unstable and distrusted, how can the central government's progress on any given initiative be evaluated during this transitional period? Is there really a new social order in Indonesia's post-Suharto period? Though there are now many groups working toward increased accountability in Indonesia, the question remains as to whether or not effective representation at the

"Honestly in Jakarta, decentralization is sometimes a mere footnote...though there is naturally greater concern on this topic at the regional level."

center, once achieved, will be enough to build the trust needed for the successful implementation of decentralization policies. Is decentralization a good idea for Indonesia? Can it be successful and sustainable? Has it succeeded thus far?

The symposium highlighted several of the major issues surrounding the decentralization process in Indonesia. Topics such as a corrupt and weak state, an overbearing military, continual socio-religious violence, environmental degradation, international investment, the role of Islam and other various civil society actors were analyzed and discussed.

Introduction to Indonesia

Indonesia is an independent republic consisting of more than 13,500 islands spread over 3,000 miles. The country occupies a strategic place on international security maps produced by the U.S. Department of Defense. Due to this fact, the relationship between Indonesia and the United States has long been intimate. In recent years the clandestine superpower patronage that the U.S. afforded Suharto's military dictatorship for over 32 years has been unraveled by scholars and journalists. Even so, the American public and the mainstream international media had largely ignored Indonesia until the May 1998 riots brought pejorative attention to its people. Although reports often contain statements about the economic and political turmoil that inflects the violence, there is little serious analysis of the structural realities of the Indonesian nation which work to cause the various forms of presumed "ethnic" and "religious" tensions. The lingering effects of colonialist-imperialist structures, imposed on Indonesia by Western Europe, Japan and the United States, are also little acknowledged.

Indonesia declared independence in 1949 after over three centuries of Dutch colonial rule in Java, decades of colonial extraction from the provinces, and two years of Japanese occupation. In the first twenty post-independence years, Indonesia, though glorified in the impassioned speeches of its first president, President Sukarno, was defined by intense poverty, an unstable economy, Islamic rebellion and a growing split between nationalists, Islamists and communists. The United States government, working through the CIA, added to Indonesia's political rift in its responsibility for Cold-War maneuvers that exasperated the Indonesian situation at the time. The US' connection to the failed coup of 1965 and its disastrous aftermath, is an issue that is too often downplayed in analyses of the Indonesian nation. But this fact must be underscored if we are to understand the current socio-political climate in Indonesia. From 1965-1998, the Indonesian armed forces, commonly known as ABRI, were rumored to have devoted \$1 million per day on military spending and were labeled as one of the most barbarous armies in modern history. World Bank estimates suggest that over the last 20 years, 30%

Islam

Indonesia has come under increased scrutiny lately in an attempt to understand the nature of the country's particular brand of Islam. Historically, Indonesian Muslims have a reputation for belonging to the most moderate variety and not inclined to participate in radical or extremist Islamic organizations like those known in the Middle East. The Bali bombing of October 12, 2002 did not necessarily disprove this assertion, but it verified the existence of extremist Islamic organizations active in Indonesia and linked directly, or indirectly, with international terrorist organizations, namely Al Qaeda. This is not to say that Indonesia is a "terrorist hotbed." However, Islamic and Christian extremism, an already complex issue in Indonesia has been increasing. This takes on a new global significance in the post-September 11th era, and international pressure to join the War on Terrorism can, in some cases, work to veil blatant human rights abuses committed by the nation's security forces.

International Responsibility

The international community has an enormous amount to contribute to Indonesia's local communities through initiatives on education, law, political transformations. Transnational communications between various actors will be a critical component in Indonesian state reform.

of Indonesia's development budget has disappeared due to nationwide government corruption at all levels (*Time Magazine*, 24 May 1999).

By May of 1998, with the Asian economic crisis at its apex, Indonesia was in the midst of a violent political upheaval. For over three decades Suharto's New Order government had been mixing state corruption, severe economic disparity, and institutionalized religious and ethnic discrimination into a recipe for disaster, catalyzed by the economic crisis which swept across Southeast Asia in 1997. Indonesia was the worst hit by the crisis, and by mid-1998, food prices had skyrocketed, the value of the *rupiah* had plummeted, and although massive unemployment and poverty plagued the Indonesian nation, President Suharto (along with his family and political cohorts) enjoyed luxurious lifestyles, clearly a product of massive corruption, collusion and nepotism, or KKN, as its known in its Indonesian acronym. Mass student protests occurred throughout the archipelago, and were increasing in number and intensity in the capital city of Jakarta. On May 12th, the military and police, perhaps fearful of losing total control of the situation, quelled protests at Trisakti University in Jakarta with tear gas and bullets, both rubber and real, killing at least four students (the number remains in question) and injuring many more (GATRA Info Service, online Jurnal Teknologi Informasi, "The Trisakti Tragedy," Number 29/IV, 6 June 1998). The next day thousands rioted on the streets, so-called ethnic and religious clashes ensued that targeted ethnic-Chinese residents and business owners, and large sections of Jakarta went up in flames. Tensions surrounding the lingering stereotypes of ethnic-Chinese wealth and power had easily been used as a (government-manipulated) tool to divert blame from government cronies and to incite violence against the ethnic-Chinese. Following the protests and President Suharto's inability to quell the violence, he was forced to step down after more than 32 years in office, and his Vice-President, Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, was temporarily installed as president. The New Order had officially been ousted and the reform movement (*reformasi*) was launched.

It is important to note that the events of May 1998, which culminated in three days of racialized aggression against the ethnic-Chinese in Jakarta, were but a small part of the Suharto regime's exercise of lethal authority against Indonesians more generally. Any analysis of the economic crisis or the subsequent political upheaval and violence that followed, is not easily contained within the geographic or historical borders of the Indonesian nation. Five years after the initial democratic transition began, political instability continues to plague the daily existence of those who are connected (however remotely) to the Indonesian nation-state, including neighboring countries in ASEAN, Australia, international investors, and in a beneficial way, opportunistic Islamic extremists responsible for the numerous terrorist attacks since 1998.

The outbreaks of terror on the streets of Jakarta and elsewhere in 1998 are mere symptoms of broader structural issues that have been brewing in the Indonesian political stew for decades.

Political reform during and after the fall of Suharto's New Order government in 1998 has allowed for greater freedom for all Indonesian citizens in regard to public speech and demonstration, written opinion, media, and education. However, the current political system remains notoriously corrupt. There have been constant transfers of power, and the communal violence that has plagued the country for decades continues in places like Aceh, Ambon, Central Kalimantan, Jakarta, Lombok, Poso and Papua (Irian Jaya). Rumors insist that much of the current violence is government-instigated - while others claim that leaders in Jakarta simply do not have the human resources (i.e. army/policy force), means or influence to end it.

As Indonesia attempts a transition toward stability and democracy, the issue of government decentralization becomes an increasingly crucial one. Following the Dutch colonial model, the relationship between Jakarta and the provinces has been based on extraction and buttressed by violence and human rights abuse. While rational decision-making about decentralization from Indonesia's leadership seems well-intentioned, if not lacking in urgency, lingering resentments from the provinces and much confusion and misinformation about the procedure and the players and a loss of dignity works against this process. With such split commitments to this cause, it is no wonder that there is mistrust between the center and periphery. How can the Indonesian government prevent further polarization of the sides? The reallocation of state funds and natural resource revenues, while an important step, are not enough.

The intricate nature of the so-called ethnic and religious conflicts plaguing the archipelago at this time speaks to a need for a reanalysis of the core foundation of the Indonesian nation. Reconciliation at various levels, and sincere conflict resolution efforts, will also be necessary if a sustainable socio-political transformation is to take place in Indonesia. Instability, economic disparity, a weak legal system, corruption in society, military and government, social distrust, environmental degradation, violence and the loss of cultural dignity are human rights issues that cannot be ignored as the decentralization process moves forth. But whether or not any mechanism at the national level will be able to successfully address each of these varied and complex issues remains to be seen.

Although decentralization in Indonesia faces incredible obstacles, looking at it in a more global and historical framework also allows its successes to be acknowledged. Indonesia's decentralization, which followed a "big bang" model (meaning an all-at-once process of decentralization rather

Decentralization policies are implemented by Jakarta through two laws, both of which were passed in 1999:

Law 22 regarding regional governance

Law 25 regarding fiscal balance between the central government and the regions (particularly in regard to natural resource revenue distribution)

For the full text in English and Bahasa Indonesia are available at the following website:

www.preventconflict.org/portal/main/treaties_decentralization.php

than a gradual process) is unprecedented in the world and deserves some acclaim for its relatively smooth transition. Since the implementation of the regional autonomy policy on January 1, 2001, Indonesia has decentralized an enormous number of previously centralized civil servant duties, officially decentralized all but five government tasks, and redirected international aid from earmarked grants to unconditional funds to be used at the district's discretion. While doing so, there was no evidence of any further breakdown in government services. And while far from perfect, the decision-making process on how resources are to be spent at the national and regional level are beginning to happen.

Indonesia is in the process of tackling similar issues in its new relationship with the former province of East Timor (now an autonomous nation-state, more commonly known as *Timor Leste*). The Commission for Reception, Truth & Reconciliation has been established to deal with the human rights abuses that were committed in East Timor by the Indonesian army and others. However, an ineffective legal system and general disorganization are proving to be major obstacles in the successful implementation of the Commission's mandates. Thus far nearly all those prosecuted have been ethnic East Timorese and not the ranking army generals and police who were implicated in the masterminding of the terror following the independence referendum in 1999. A mythologized version of the events, on both sides, further complicates this, and first-rate investigators will be needed to effectively navigate Indonesia towards a respectable human rights record.

A revamping of the Indonesian justice system could be the impetus behind establishing trust, not only in East Timor, but in Indonesian's own regions as well. A clear expression of sincerity from the central government, such as the end of impunity for the civilian and military leaders responsible for human rights abuses, would be an ideal first step. The East Timor case presents a valuable lesson for Indonesia, in that when dealing with ethnic or religious conflicts, the Indonesian government may have more success by examining each case individually and contextually, taking into account each region's *Adat* (custom) and colonial history, in an attempt to resolve these entrenched conflicts. Indonesia's thriving NGO movement could easily contribute to the conflict resolution policies, because of its focus during the 1980s and 90s, on identifying and preserving Indonesia's many diverse customs (*Adat*).

Decentralizing a Corrupt and Weak State

Decentralization is not new to Indonesia. Papua was officially decentralized in 1969, although there was little, if any, effect on its resource and revenue distribution, and policies regarding the province continued to be decided in Jakarta. Nation-wide decentralization has

been discussed and debated since the early 1970's. Former President Suharto experimented with the concept in one district, though no one other than a few interested political scientists knew much about it.

Before the fall of Suharto in 1998, the Indonesian government was extremely centralized and power was in the hands of a mere few. New Order policy had attempted to centralize not only politics, but also the economy and religious beliefs. All Muslim parties were fused into one, The United Development Party. Islamic education was tightly controlled and fundamentalist Islam was greatly suppressed. Another tool in Suharto's plan for national integration was the New Order's use of forced migration, which doubled as a mechanism for spreading Java's crowded masses across the archipelago while simultaneously "javanizing" the outer islands. Transmigration, as it came to be known, continues to have disruptive effects on both migrant and local communities throughout the country.

The fall of Suharto, and the ensuing *reformasi* that occurred over the next two years, caused this false sense of unity to quickly vanish. New political parties formed, religious factions became increasingly evident, civil society (and environmental) movements gained momentum, and the topic of decentralization returned to the political table.

Decentralization was implemented by Suharto's successor, President Habibie in a seemingly shrewd grab at political survival, and was not carefully considered in regard to its potential effectiveness or long-term implications. Not to say that there were not logical reasons for the policy's genesis; economic efficiency, resource mobilization, and nation building economic efficiency, resource mobilization, and nation-building are the potential benefits of any decentralization process. In Indonesia it was touted as a movement that would allow local citizens (via communications with their local administrators) a greater say in regional issues and more control of local natural resources and the revenues they generated. This concept is problematic because decentralization has focused on distributing power to the local level of the region rather than the province, endowing people without the experience or capacity to effectively represent their constituents. And while the decentralization process may allow for a more ethnically diverse set of actors to hold offices, the reality is that (due to long-standing disparities in education and wealth) certain ethnicities will continue to be employed while others remain economically and socially marginalized. One of the central government's attempts to counter this inevitability is through encouraging officials to hold posts in their own regions exclusively. This policy creates a different problem in that it encourages local governments to become more inward looking. The trend that is already being seen throughout Indonesia is the rapid proliferation of requests to the central government to approve proposals for the creation of new districts that almost invariably are drawn along ethnic or religious lines. How

Government Regulations For Decentralization

Decentralization Laws 22 & 25 require numerous implementing regulations in order to become fully operational. There are also numerous presidential decrees, ministerial decrees, circular letters and other guidelines in place for this purpose. The key government regulations which have been passed since May 1999 include, but are not limited to, the following*:

No. 25/2000

Government Authority and the Provincial Authority as an Autonomous Region

No. 84/2000

Regional Apparatus Organization Guideline

No. 104/2000

Equilibrium Funds

No. 105/2000

Regional Financial Management and Accountability

No. 107/2000

Regional Borrowing

No. 108/2000

Accountability Mechanism for the Head of the Region

No. 129/2000

Requirements for the Establishment and for the Criteria of Setting-Up, Abolishing and Merging Regions

No. 39/2001

Implementing Deconcentrated Tasks

No. 152/2001

Implementing Co-Administration Tasks

No. 56/2001

Reporting the Implementation of Local Governance

No. 65/2001

Regional Taxes

No. 66/2001

Regional Levies

*This information was taken from the SfDM website: <http://www.gtzsfdm.or.id>

Chronology Of Recent U.S.-Indonesian Military Engagement*

- Indonesian armed forces have received \$1 billion in U.S. weaponry and millions in U.S. training since they first occupied East Timor in 1975
- The Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHISC), formerly known as the U.S. Army School of Americas (SOA), is infamous for its training of Latin American soldiers in combat, counter-insurgency, and counter-narcotics. Based in Fort Benning, Georgia, it has been named as a training site for TNI/ABRI soldiers.
- 1992 As a direct result of grassroots pressure, Congress cut off Indonesia's International Military Education and Training (IMET) aid in October, after the Dili, East Timor massacre where hundreds were killed and two U.S. journalists were badly beaten. The legislation became law as part of the Fiscal Year 1993 (FY1993) Foreign Operations Appropriations Act and was re-enacted in FY1994 and FY1995.
- 1994 E-IMET was partially restored after intense pressure from Jakarta under the conditions of the Leahy Amendment. U.S. officials claimed the change was more than an added letter because Indonesian officers now had to receive training in human rights and were limited to classroom instruction. But while Congress and the public thought this was the end of the story, Pentagon documents reveal that the U.S. military also continued training the Indonesian army in lethal tactics under the JCET program. The notoriously violent and abusive Kopassus forces have received 26 of the 41 training exercises offered under JCET in the past few years.

continued on page 9

seemingly contradictory policies will affect local, migrant, and "mixed" communities in Indonesia remains unknown.

On the economic side of the issue, the new decentralization legislation (Law 22 and Law 25) is a brave attempt coming out of the time of Habibie's presidency, but these laws are often confusing and contradictory.

Revenue sharing was suggested by the central government, but 52 regional leaders effectively protested. Local governments have also been unwilling to accept the responsibility of public domestic debt because they believe it to be tied to a few Chinese conglomerates, and that those conglomerates should pay. Responsibility for foreign debt has seen resistance as well due to the fact that so many national projects are bestowed upon local communities without first receiving local input. In many cases the local communities are in fact circumvented by local elites who have privileged access to such "national projects."

There are two additional autonomy laws for West Papua and Aceh that devolve fiscal responsibility to the level of the province rather than the district, but it remains questionable whether or not these laws will assist in resolving the violent conflicts in these regions. The autonomy laws are incomplete and were drafted with little to no consultation with the provinces. Important to note is that neither law allows for local independent human rights commissions or tribunals. Tribunal Law 26 (2000) states that these may only be conducted at the national level, and as such trials for all of Western Indonesia must be conducted in Jakarta, while those with reference to Eastern Indonesia must take place in Makassar, Sulawesi.

Culturally appropriate initiatives to uncover truth, heal trauma, restore dignity, and reconcile differences must be implemented as a means of conflict prevention. The current autonomy being offered to the regions is not necessarily the autonomy desired. Many of the outlying regions, although geographically isolated, are not politically disempowered. Each pays close attention to what is happening in other conflict regions, and particularly so with regard to autonomy legislation. This is a cause for great concern to the central government in Jakarta. So much so that while it has allowed regional political parties to freely form, it nevertheless requires that they maintain an office in Jakarta. Such a restriction presents huge barriers to local parties by way of an increased need for monetary resources, a hampering of true political freedom, and constraints on time with local constituencies. Accusations of elitism, superiority and xenophobia are common resentments aimed at Jakarta, and as such there remains a significant psychological distance between the desires of the capitol and that of the outer island regions. The loss of cultural dignity amongst

"Since 1963, the human rights situation has been tremendously affected in Papua. The military see Papua as their killing grounds...through economic activity and military practice. It is a place where military officials can gain rank in the eyes of those in Jakarta."

local community actors is an issue that will not necessarily be resolved through autonomy or the decentralization of political power and resource revenues, and one which must be addressed at the local, national and international level.

Jakarta's continued monopoly on conflict resolution and the solving of human rights issues on behalf of outer-island communities (at the level of the legislative and the symbolic) is contrary to the central government's stated commitment to decentralize power. Furthermore, as fiscal responsibility and resource distribution is devolved to the provincial level in West Papua and Aceh, the stakes for local political office become greater. That fact, combined with an irresponsible military and police force and the tendency to draw new boundaries for ethnically defined constituencies, could work to incite further violence and corruption at the regional level. Though most agree that decentralization is not the primary cause of the violence, if the regional autonomy initiatives are to be successful and sustainable, a national commitment to conflict resolution must be put in motion.

Regional Conflict and The Indonesian Military (TNI/ABRI)

The Indonesian military holds a unique and confounding position in the country. It is the only institution that spans the sprawling archipelago, yet simultaneously its abuses are one of the main grievances for provinces and secessionist groups actively seeking greater autonomy or independence. Under Former President Suharto's leadership it created a seemingly contradictory system of encouraging regional conflict so that it can reinforce its claims that it is the only institution capable of putting down regional revolts and holding the nation together. It is well known that the military has played a significant role in perpetuating conflicts at the local level. For example, each year in Lampung, Sumatra, a few hundred people are "spontaneously" killed on the streets due to antagonisms between transmigrant and indigenous populations. Other examples come from Central Kalimantan, Polo, Palu, Maluku and others. A recent study done at *Universitas Trisakti* in Jakarta revealed that the spatial distribution of the violence against the ethnic Chinese in May 1998 suggests that the riots were in fact orchestrated, not spontaneous.

The discussion about military reform in Indonesia has slowed and there are no signs of internal reform coming from within the military at this time. The military strongly supports the idea of a centralized government, for its own selfish reasons, and will continue to assert itself into the political dialogue, regardless of its absence from the official policy-making bodies. Ideally, the military should focus solely on national defense, but the lines of

- 1995 In the FY1995 bill, the House of Representatives tried to close a loophole under which Indonesia was able to purchase military training. Members of Congress expressed "outrage" that "despite its vocal embrace of human rights," the Clinton administration would allow Indonesia to buy military training. Congress continued to ban IMET (for FY1996), but Expanded-IMET, which is limited to classroom instruction, was allowed.
- 1997 In March, the House Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee heard administration testimony that the Pentagon sold Indonesia military training without congressional notification or consent throughout 1996, causing Congress to limit appropriations to E-IMET for FY1997 through FY2000.
- 1998 In March, Rep. Lane Evans (D-IL) and the East Timor Action Network released Pentagon documents showing that U.S. Army and Marine personnel had trained Indonesian soldiers under the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program every few months since 1992. Indonesian troops were trained in air assault, urban warfare, and psychological operations thirty-six times between 1992 and 1997 without congressional knowledge or approval. Much of that training went to the notorious Kopassus counter-insurgency unit, "the most feared, most hated, and most abusive Indonesian military unit in East Timor" accused of carrying out torture, disappearances and extra-judicial killings
- 1998 Responding to congressional and grassroots pressure, the Pentagon suspended the JCET program for Indonesia in May.
- 1999 The Republican controlled Congress passed the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act of 2000, which stipulates that military ties will not be restored

continued on page 10

until Indonesia has met the “Leahy conditions,” named for Vermont Senator Patrick Leahy.

- 2002 The US Senate’s appropriations committee passed an amendment to lift restrictions on the Indonesian forces taking part in the Pentagon’s International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. There are still several stages to go before the bill becomes law, but the approval of \$400,000 for Indonesia to take part in the IMET scheme is the first move towards warming military ties since they were severed in 1999 in protest against violence by Jakarta-backed militia in East Timor.

*Much of this information comes from the website of the World Policy Institute:
<http://www.worldpolicy.org>

command and responsibility often remain unclear at the local level and this has caused many conflicts between officers at the local level. At this point, if the military were to permanently fragment, it would most likely be due to personal conflict or disagreement rather than differing ideological beliefs, such as religious schisms or disagreements over the future role of the military in Indonesian political life.

Recent statements from the Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S.-ASEAN Business Council, and the Bush administration suggest that the military is central to Indonesia’s stability. Characterizing the military as a stabilizing force, however, ignores its culpability in prolonging and exacerbating conflict in Indonesia’s outer-island regions. Western media coverage of the conflicts works to support this view by offering a rather simplified version of the complex and multiple causes therein. Systemic violence at the level of the nation-state is often downplayed to make room for less accurate reports on sensational topics such as ethnic and religious differences or seemingly random cases of local populations running *amok*. The United Nations, the U.S. Department of State, human rights groups, and organizations such as those already mentioned above are informed by these headlines, and this can have serious policy implications for Indonesia. How do we get foreign journalists to spend more time in conflict zones? How do we get them better connected with NGOs on the ground, so that they may do more informed reporting? Conflict in Indonesia is not one problem. Regional conflicts must be viewed within their cultural, social, historical contexts by the national government. The fact is that religion and ethnicity are most often vehicles through which money, land and resources are fought over.

How can the U.S. best support the changing role of the military in Indonesia? Some are determined to ban U.S.-Indonesian military engagement and the sale of weapons from the U.S. government. However, if the bill for such a ban were to focus on sectarian or communal violence and counter-terrorism, there is a danger of deflecting the real issues at hand. Under the conditions laid out in the Leahy Amendment, U.S. government-financed arms sales, military education and training (IMET) continue. Some assert that increased military engagement between the two countries coincides with increased military brutality in Indonesia. The reverse does not seem to hold true. Even though 1999 was the final cut-off date for exporting U.S. military weapons to Indonesia, these measures did not necessarily improve *TNI* behavior as we can see by the military and military-armed paramilitary atrocities in East Timor. While the topic of military engagement with Indonesia remains under debate, tensions around global terrorism post-September 11th, and ASEAN’s recent anti-terror pact with the U.S., work to further complicate the issues.

East Timor succeeded in achieving the pinnacle of “decentralization” and has given hope to other areas seeking independence (such as Aceh and Papua). The East Timorese independence movement was successful due to:

graphic evidence of Indonesian military brutality; savvy leadership abroad; and the fact that the United Nations had never recognized the integration of East Timor into the Indonesian nation. Its success has also strengthened the resolve of Megawati and the Indonesian military (*TNI*) to resist any further fragmentation of the country.

Violations in regard to money and forgery by Indonesian military and government officials continue with great impunity. As power and revenue decentralizes from the national to the regional level, some are concerned that corruption will follow suit. Others assert that even if that were to happen, the corruption would prove easier to monitor and control at the local level. Of course every conflict is not military or state instigated. Communities and their own officials are at conflict as well, and the conflict lines are not merely limited to a regional-national dichotomy.

Islam

The opening-up of the political system after 1998 allowed previously suppressed groups to form parties. Many of these new voices came from groups wanting to increase the status of Islam in the world's largest Muslim country. However, the goals of these groups varied tremendously, ranging from those who advocated for the formation of an Islamic state to those like *Partiai Cinta Dama* who believed that recitations of the name of God were the answer to the nation's woes. Another, the Islamic Salvation Party, functions as a globally organized group that promotes global Islam; the group has websites in Danish, English, Indonesian and Persian.

In this time of severe socio-economic chaos, Islam is positioned to provide a legitimate venue of identity to the Indonesian citizen. Under these conditions, educated, under-employed males (aged 19-39) are particularly drawn to Islam due to the fact that their aspirations for economic and social accomplishment often reach far beyond their ability to obtain it. Thus it seems unlikely that regional conflicts that have religious overtones will easily or quickly subside, for radical Islamic rhetoric may have deeper and more tangible implications, including a tendency toward violence. Many of the recently founded extremist Islamic groups appear to be committed, if only in theory, to the establishment of Islamic law or *sharia*. However, many of these groups disagree on what their respective versions of sharia will look like, therefore there is little chance for them to unite in a large block to push for the implementation of Islamic law.

The Islamic group, Laskar Jihad, until it disbanded only days before the Bali bombing, was perhaps the most prominent of the militant Islamic groups in Indonesia. While its leadership denied any connection to international terrorist organizations it nevertheless posed a serious domestic threat to peace and stability in Indonesia. For example, Laskar Jihad viewed Papua as

Who Is Laskar Jihad?

- The English translation of Laskar Jihad is Holy War Warriors
- Laskar Jihad is a paramilitary organization founded in 2000 by Jaffar Umar Thalib
- It is estimated that Laskar Jihad currently has 6000 members
- Laskar Jihad considers itself to be a civil society organization
- Laskar Jihad maintains a consistently anti-American rhetoric
- Laskar Jihad is believed to have close ties to Suharto's former regime
- Laskar Jihad continues an oblique but well-known link to the Indonesian military (TNI) through exchanges of arms, cash (into the millions of dollars) and favors
- Laskar Jihad has threatened to wage a holy war against Christians in some regions and has offered to join the Indonesian military in squelching secessionist efforts. Laskar Jihad has thus far been accused of instigating attacks on Christians groups in Sulawesi, Maluku and West Papua
- Western intelligence sources report that Laskar Jihad was founded with covert backing of Indonesian military hardliners who wished to destabilize the post-Suharto reformist government of Abdurrahman Wahid
- Jaffar Umar Thalib has stated that the Laskar Jihad mission is to forge a spiritual form of jihad through preaching, not fighting. He also asserts that al-Qaeda ideology is not in line with true Islam and that Laskar Jihad no connection to Osama bin Laden
- As of August 2002 Laskar Jihad is not listed on the U.S. Department of State's Current List of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations

“the land of no religion,” and looked on the separatist movement as a solely Christian one. The group claimed that it would collaborate with Indonesian armed forces in the suppression of the separatist movement and support the continuing integration of Papua into the Indonesian nation. After a recent investigation into Laskar Jihad activities, and an interview with the its head in May 2002, it was reported that since the year 2000 it had sent about 200 people to Papua and established seven regents for their work. The group was also accused of carrying out major attacks against Christians in Sulawesi and the Maluku over the last two years. However, Laskar Jihad considers itself to be a civil society organization. Some believe that the presence of this radical fringe group must simply be viewed as growing pains in the democratization process, and therefore must be accepted as part of the development of the Indonesian nation and its changing political landscape. Were it not for the group’s rather questionable ties to Indonesian security forces and its blatant violations of Indonesian law, this perception might seem more plausible.

Another organization that has emerged out from underground status since the fall of Suharto is Jemaah Islamiah. Headed by spiritual leader Abu Bakar Bashir, Jemaah Islamiah has been linked to Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda network and is almost definitively tied to the Bali Bombing of October 2002. Unlike Laskar Jihad, JI, as it is commonly known, does not have any “national” aspirations or overt connections or ties with the Indonesian military. One of the more interesting developments since 1998 is the degree to which new extremist Islamic parties or organizations adopt local or national political aspirations, or regional or global ones. Both could have potentially disastrous effects, the former more worrying to the Indonesian government and the latter to its neighbors and the international security community.

Environmental Costs

Transmigration, mining, and agriculture in Indonesia (often tied up in transnational corporate interests) are sometimes referred to as the new colonialism, “the colonialism of development.” There are virtually no rights in place for indigenous peoples in regard to their lands and natural resources. Indonesia continues to operate under Article 33 in the Indonesian constitution, which regards the government as the economic owner of all lands. But for many groups in Indonesia, the environment is an integral part of their local culture. If the land is destroyed, the people who live on the land also suffer, and this can create psycho-cultural problems resulting in a loss of both personal and social dignity. It remains to be seen how the agrarian and national resource management reforms currently being implemented in Indonesia will affect the decentralization process and local cultural rights.

The environment is an extremely sensitive issue in the ongoing debate on decentralization, as it is at the crux of the negotiations over the revenues

created from natural resources. The profits from natural resources will not automatically fall into the hands of the local communities. In fact, it should be noted that local communities themselves are actually quite passive actors in this process, while it is the local elites who are involved in such contestations. The assumption that the processes of resource distribution and environmental conservation, if implemented at the local level, will be democratic is rather naive.

The Indonesian Economy and Business

It is not only environmental destruction and violence in the regions that are of serious concern, but also the grim outlook for Indonesia's economic future. The international financial community is very involved in this scenario and thus the issue must be addressed globally, not just nationally. The international factor is likely the final and possibly the most crucial factor in the success of the country's decentralization. The return to stability and the continued promise of stability, both economically and politically, is the proof of decentralization's success and the key to gaining the trust of the foreign investment community. There are a number of questions that must be answered in order to understand the importance of the role of the international community in Indonesia's transition. One must ask whether foreign investors are part of the solution or the problem? Will they contribute to an increased economic disparity amongst Indonesia's citizens? How do we address political instability that affects the tendency or interest in foreign investment both at the regional and national level? How do we deal with challenging security issues abroad, while not knowing how they may play out nationally or locally? More non-confrontational and candid forums that include Indonesian NGOs and foreign business investors are needed in order to effectively address these issues. There is urgency for these groups to come together to engage in problem solving, crisis management and crisis prevention work.

There are concerns that the new devolution of power to the regions will create a bureaucratic nightmare for international businesses. However, it is quite natural for these multinational businesses to deal with various levels of government abroad, and this is not a new practice in Indonesia. National-level institutions (central bank, economic development agency, and other scientific institutions) have developed rapidly at the cost of local-level development, riding on resource revenues from the provinces. Local-level institutions have not been given proper attention and only since 1985 has much attempt been made to correct this imbalance. The lack of ownership and involvement by local people is being addressed, but the lingering effects of their marginalization have created a widespread distrust of government-sponsored "development.". They are understandably not always willing to buy into this sort of "progress." And although the government has initiated a very radical decentralization policy, local capacity to implement the policy

Obstacles to Overcome in the Decentralization Process

- Corrupt and weak legal, judicial and security systems
- Slow transition to democratic practices and principles
- Regional communal violence
- Military violence and human rights abuses carried out against the Indonesian people
- Environmental exploitation and degradation
- Loss of cultural dignity
- Lingering issues of trauma, fear and distrust amongst the various minority actors
- A weak domestic economy coupled with irresponsible transnational corporate investment
- Lack of resources and education in the regions
- Islamic and Christian fanaticism
- Apathy and a lack of understanding from the international community
- Unresolved issues on the subject of national unity versus regional autonomy

remains limited. Increased public debt, oil subsidies, and revenue sharing are issues of concern to the central government in regard to macro-level stability. What is really needed is a broader strategy so that economic capital can return to remedy the situation. Ownership and control of money is the main concern of the provinces in regard to decentralization. For local politicians and business people, the economic aspects of regional autonomy often subjugate important issues like environmental protection, cultural dignity and other social concerns.

One immediate change to be observed is the quality of the relationships between the national and local levels of governments. During the *Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun* (Five-year Development Plan) the suggestions were identical for every region. This was exemplar of top-down development process. Now local elites are involved in that decision-making process. Problematic is the fact that they often do so without consulting the local communities to assess their needs. There is a lack of checks and balances and poor monitoring of local-level institutions. The younger generation is idealistic in their capacity-building efforts and this provides us with some optimism about the decentralization policies, but there is a lot of concern coming from them as well.

As mentioned, decentralization is a product of the *reformasi* movement that began in 1998. The central government said it would take care of defense, foreign policy, fiscal policy and religion, and that the rest, including natural resource revenue collection and other (trans)national business exchanges, would be taken care of at the regional level. Good governance was to be shifted from central to regional levels to prevent separatist tendencies. But there has been little follow up to Laws 22 & 25 and no timetable set for accomplishing the goals to which they aspire. Though both laws insist on the need for a unitary state, at times the central government appears to be losing its grip on the regions. Among the elite in Jakarta (particularly in the business sector) there is concern that in five to ten years the profits that they have so comfortably gathered over the past few decades from regional natural resource revenues will be less accessible. The decentralization process must be coupled with political stability and a goodwill commitment from the government and the international community. However, there are limits to what can be achieved within the confines of the current state bureaucratic system, and until these issues are resolved it appears the Indonesian economy will continue to suffer. Whether or not international investors will make the commitment to support the nation's political transition remains to be seen.

International Responsibility

There are some important and useful things that international agencies can do to assist the decentralization process in Indonesia. The United Nations, European Union, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and UNDP,

along with the governments of Great Britain, Japan and the United States, have all been variously involved in humanitarian efforts within Indonesia over the last few years. However, frustrations in regard to government corruption, incompetence and irresponsibility led to the eventual cessation of many of their initiatives. Immediately after the government of President Wahid (Gus Dur) replaced that of Habibie, the Partnership for Governance Reform (composed of the UNDP and the World Bank) was formed, and later became a forum for dialogue between Indonesia and the international community. A current initiative to deal with police reform is also being implemented by this group, but there remains a need for sincere attention to be paid to Indonesia's Constitution (a document that was intended to be revisited after it was hastily drafted in 1945). If these issues are properly dealt with, decentralization may be better addressed.

Decentralization provides a wonderful opportunity for such bodies to reestablish and solidify ties with Indonesia through the testing of more creative civil society initiatives. Indonesia's politically and ethnically fragmented society necessitates a structure of international support which ensures that natural resources and political influence are divided in a democratically agreed upon manner. NGO's, due to their skills and commitment, are ideally suited to enter into co-operative partnerships with governments. They can conduct culturally sensitive field research, assist with policy formation, help to ensure the efficient delivery of services and do follow-up research on the ground.

Civil society organizations, albeit strictly censored under Suharto's reign, have a long history in Indonesia. In the post-New Order period many of these groups have shifted their focus from social and religious concerns to that of political watchdogging. As the democratization and decentralization processes unfold NGO-participation will become more crucial, and influential international bodies have a responsibility to support them in these efforts.

International and internal fears of a fragmented Indonesian nation continue to dominate most discussions around civil society, conflict resolution, democratic transition, and government decentralization. The core principle of national sovereignty, and more importantly unity, is taken very seriously in Indonesia by nearly all Indonesians, from the riches to the poorest. Efforts need to be made by the international community to counter the concern that even humanitarian types of international assistance are covertly aimed to threaten the unity of the nation. Various stakeholders can work to assist in debunking this myth by tagging conflict prevention to humanitarian assistance programs. If in striving for the creation of a more stable and democratic Indonesia, we adhere to the concept of one Indonesian nation, encompassing hundreds of different ethnic and religious peoples, then we must also make concerted efforts to include these various local actors in our work.

Indonesia is indeed a complex situation for the international community to deal with especially in the midst of a global war on terror. However, in supporting Indonesia's critical transition to democracy and social responsibility, there seems no reason why international policy cannot simultaneously work to resist global terror and domestic human rights violations. Indonesia is going through a very complex transition and there is a clear need for a more sophisticated understanding on the part of the international community about what is happening there. There is a role for the international community in Indonesia's transition, however it has yet to be defined or accepted by the Indonesian people. The following questions will identify some of the key issues that need to be addressed for the cooperation to be fruitful. How can corporations contribute to capacity building in communities and local governments? How might NGOs monitor these conflicts or provide support to those doing the monitoring? How might conditionality be applied more broadly, in a categorical rather than specific manner? And how can the state be appropriately rewarded for meeting those conditions? The international community can bring a world of global experience to the table and assist in various development efforts at the local level as well as the national. They are positioned to play a mediating role, particularly in areas where natural resources are being contested.

Conclusion: Looking Forward

By exploring the social costs of decentralization, the roles of civil society organizations nationally and internationally, and the impact of coalition building within Indonesian communities, the symposium participants aspired to learn in greater depth about the human dimensions of the conflicts in Indonesia, and to better understand what constructive roles the international community might play in supporting a recovering Indonesia. While the Indonesia symposium succeeded in bringing a diverse array of interested participants together, little of the discussion challenged the undercurrent of Indonesian nationalism. Overall, there was a suggestion that if decentralization is to succeed, national unity (coupled with respect for socio-religious difference) must be sought. There were, however, some that expressed their doubts about the possibility for peaceful reconciliation of the conflicts between the provinces with the central state, and thus viewed the potential benefits of successful decentralization as too little, too late. So the question remains: Does the goal of an institutionalized multi-national state preclude any successful implementation of regional autonomy in Indonesia? Is decentralization a good thing for Indonesia? Can it be successful?

This is a positive and historically interesting time to be involved with Indonesia. As government decentralization occurs, access to resources and information for marginalized peoples throughout the archipelago will become even more critical. Democratic participation at the regional level is essential in ensuring that local elites and low-level government officials are not the sole beneficiaries of this new redistribution of power and wealth. As such, projects that focus on the empowerment of Indonesia's local outer-island communities will be a critical and timely component in promoting civil society and securing the stability of the Indonesian nation. There is a transitional cost that goes with successful decentralization, and the process in Indonesia will require patience, time and a dedication of resources and involvement to empower its various actors.

ADDENDA

Agenda

Asia Society, New York, New York • June 17, 2002

8:30 A.M. **Greeting - Coffee/Tea**

9:00 A.M. **Welcome and Introductory Remarks**

Robert W. Radtke, Vice President, Policy & Business, Asia Society

Presiding: *Shyama Venkateswar, Associate Director,*

Asian Social Issues Program (ASIP), Asia Society

9:20 A.M. **Overview of the Conflict in Indonesia**

Moderator: *Sidney Jones, International Crisis Group*

Speakers: *Riwanto Tirtosudarmo, LIPI*

John Rumbiak, West Papuan Institute for Human Rights and Advocacy

Meidyatama Suryodiningrat, The Jakarta Post

Hendro Sangkoyo, Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology

10:00 A.M. **Panel I – Addressing Decentralization from the Community Level**

Recognizing that since the end of the New Order much of the communal violence in Indonesia has revolved around conflicts over resource and revenue distribution, this panel will discuss the various ways in which decentralization is causing or alleviating conflicts at the community level. The focus will be on the range of conflicts that have arisen or have been exacerbated since the implementation of decentralization began. The following questions will be addressed:

- 1) Who are the local communities? What are their experiences?
How do they define what the conflicts are?
- 2) What are the costs of the conflict? (lives, labor, environment, etc.)
- 3) What are the specific issues facing local and indigenous communities?
What efforts are being made to meet these challenges?
- 4) What can national or international organizations do to support local communities?
- 5) What kind of participatory institutions are in place, or need to be in place, to facilitate dialogue on decentralization?

Moderator: *Joe Saunders, Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs*

Panelists:

John Rumbiak, West Papuan Institute for Human Rights and Advocacy

Mark Woodard, Arizona State University

Sidney Jones, International Crisis Group

11:30 A.M. **Coffee/Tea Break**

11:45 A.M. **Panel II – The Changing Role of Jakarta**

The discussion that includes people working at the national level will address the dynamic between local and national organizations, and the role of national organizations in facilitating the decentralization process. The focus will be on the challenges and advantages of resolving conflicts at the national and local levels.

The following questions will be addressed:

- 1) Who are the actors at the local and national levels respectively?
- 2) In the process of decentralization, what national conflicts are now being dealt with at a local level? What is the relationship between organizations that are represented at the local and national levels? What are differences in local versus national priorities? Are these priorities changing due to decentralization?
- 3) How can the national government help to mediate current conflicts and prevent future ones?
- 4) What are some examples of successful transfers of power from the center to the periphery?
- 5) How will the issue of local control of revenues and resources be addressed within the decentralization process?

Moderator: *Kirk Talbott, Independent Consultant*

Panelists:

Riwanto Tirtosudarmo, LIPI

Hendro Sangkoyo, Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology

Sri Mulyani, Georgia State University

Meidyatama Suryodiningrat, The Jakarta Post

1:15 P.M. **Luncheon**

1:45 P.M. **Panel III – A Role for the International Community?**

A roundtable discussion with representatives from the international community and those who work with them will focus on the involvement of the international community in local conflicts. Exploring issues that range from media coverage to foreign investment, this panel will discuss past involvement in Indonesia and possible solutions to some of Indonesia's challenges in decentralizing authority to local communities. The following questions will be addressed:

- 1) What has been the role of the international community in Indonesia?
- 2) What has been the reaction of the international community to the decentralization plan and its execution to date?
- 3) Why has there been an apparent lack of attention to some of Indonesia's conflicts abroad, while others make international headlines? Are there more effective ways in which both domestic and international NGOs can engage the communities they serve and intensify civil society interactions?
- 4) What is the role of the media in conflict areas?
- 5) How does international investment positively or negatively affect local communities?
- 6) What are some constructive roles for the U.S., the U.N., and other international organizations and NGOs, to play in these crises?

Moderator: *Wayne Forrest, American-Indonesian Chamber of Commerce*

Panelists:

Mike Jendrzeczyk, Human Rights Watch

Roy W. Bahl Jr., Georgia State University

John Miller, East Timor Action Network

Ravi Rajan, UNDP Representative

3:20 P.M. **Conclusion and Closing Remarks**

Further Reading

- Crouch, Harold A.
The Army and Politics in Indonesia, Cornell University Press, 1988.
- Emmerson, Donald K
"Southeast Asia and the United States Since 11 September," Statement prepared for a hearing, Southeast Asia after 9/11: Regional Trends and U.S. Interests, organized by the Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington D.C., 12 December 2001.
Read online at: www.house.gov/international_relations/emme1212.html
- Federspiel, Howard M.
A Dictionary of Indonesian Islam (Monographs in International Studies, Southeast Asia Series, No 94), Center for International Studies, Ohio University, Athens, OH, 1995.
- George, Kenneth
"Designs on Indonesia's Muslim Communities," *Journal of Asian Studies* 57.3 (August 1998): pp. 693-713.
- Hefner, Robert
Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia, Princeton University Press, 2000.
- Human Rights Watch World Report 2002: INDONESIA.
Read online at: www.hrw.org/wr2k2/print.cgi?asia7.html
- International Crisis Group Report (Sidney Jones)
"Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The case of the Ngruki Network in Indonesia," 8 August 2002.
"Resuming U.S.-Indonesia Military Ties," 21 May 2002.
- Kahin, McTurnan George (Ed.), Daniel S. Lev (Ed.), Ruth Thomas McVey
Making Indonesia (Studies on Southeast Asia), Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program Publications, 1996.
- La Botz, Dan
Made in Indonesia: Indonesian Workers Since Suharto, South End Press, Cambridge, MA, 2001.
- Liddle, R. William
"Indonesia's Democratic Opening," in *Government and Opposition*, 34, 1 (January 1999), pp. 94-116.
- Mawdsley, Nick, Monica Tanuhandra and Kees Holman
"Report of the EC Conflict Prevention Assessment Mission: Indonesia," European Commission Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit, March 2002.
- Malley, Michael
Social Cohesion and Conflict Management in Indonesia. Paper prepared for the Asia Regional Consultation on Social Cohesion and Conflict Management, Manila, Philippines, 16-17 March 2000.
- McCulloch, Lesley
"Trifungsi: The Role of the Indonesian Military in Business," 17-19 October 2000.
- Peluso, Nancy and Michael Watts (eds.)
Violent Environments, Cornell University Press, 2001.
- Pemberton, John
On the Subject of "Java" Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994.
- Schwarz, Adam
A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990's, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994.
- Schiller, Jim and Barbara Martin-Schillern (eds.)
Imagining Indonesia: Cultural Politics and Political Culture (Monographs in International Studies, Southeast Asia Series, No 97), Center for International Studies, Ohio University, Athens, OH, 1997.
- Scott, James C.
Seeing Like A State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed, Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.
- Scott, Peter Dale
"The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-1967."
In *Pacific Affairs*, 58 (Summer 1985), pp. 239-264.

- Siegel, James T.
A New Criminal Type in Jakarta: Counter-Revolution Today. Durham Duke University Press, 1998.
- Time—Daily
Online Edition at Time.com, “Indonesia’s Killing Fields: Remembering Suharto’s bloody rise to power 32 years ago,” 15-17 May 1998.
- TGPF, The Joint Fact-Finding Team
“Final Report of The Joint Fact-Finding Team (TGPF) on the May 13-15, 1998 Riot.” 23 October 1998. Read online at:
http://www.geocities.com/Tokyo/Palace/2313/jfft_report.html
- Usman, Syaikh
“Regional Autonomy in Indonesia; Field Experience and Emerging Challenges,” SMERU GROUP, June 2002.
- Working Group on Decentralization
“Progress Achieved in the Implementation of Indonesia’s Decentralization Policy,” Report of the Government of Indonesia for the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI) Mid Year Review, 12 June 2002.

Further Reading Online:

Decentralization Law 22 & Law 25 in English

www.preventconflict.org/portal/main/treaties_decentralization.php

International NGOs and Foundations

American Chamber of Commerce in Indonesia: www.amcham.or.id

American-Indonesian Chamber of Commerce: www.aicc.org

Asia Foundation: www.taf.org

Asia Society: www.asiasoc.org

Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID): www.ausaid.gov.au

British Council Indonesia: www.britishcouncil.or.id/index.htm

Brookings Institute: www.brookings.edu

CARE: www.care.org

Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs: www.cceia.org

Catholic Relief Services (CRS): www.crs.org

Center for Strategic and International Studies: www.csis.org (US)
www.csis.or.id (Indonesia)

Conflict Prevention Initiative at Harvard University
www.preventconflict.org/portal/main/portalhome.php

Conservation International: www.conservation.org

CorpWatch: www.corpwatch.org

Council on Foreign Relations: www.cfr.org

East Timor Action Network (ETAN): www.etan.org

East-West Center: www.eastwestcenter.org

Financial Services Volunteer Corps: www.fsvc.org

Ford Foundation: www.fordfound.org

Human Rights Watch: www.hrw.org

Indo-Pacific Conservation Alliance: www.indopacific.org

Institute of International Finance: www.iif.com

International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ): www.ictj.org

International Crisis Group (ICG): www.crisisweb.org

International Forum for Aceh (IFA): <http://acehnet.tripod.com/ifa.htm>

International Foundation for Election Systems: www.ifes.org

International Red Cross: www.icrc.org

International Institute of Economics: www.iie.com

International Institute of Education (IIE): www.iie.org

International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development (INFID): www.infid.or.id

International Peace Forum: www.intlpf.com

International Republican Institute (IRI): www.iri.org

Internews: www.internews.org • www.internews.or.id (Indonesia)

Kenan Institute: www.kenaninstitute.unc.edu • www.kiasia.org (Asia)

Mercy Corps: www.mercycorps.org

National Democratic Institute (NDI): www.ndi.org

Natural Resources Management (NRM): www.nrm.or.id

Open Society Institute (OSI): www.soros.org

Orangutan Foundation: www.orangutan.org

Oxfam International: www.oxfamamerica.org

PATH: www.path.org

Refuges International: www.refintl.org

Sasakawa Peace Foundation: www.spf.org

Smith Richardson Foundation: www.srf.org

Social Safety Net Information Clearinghouse (SSN-ICH)
www.pin-jps.or.id/Data/publikasi/JPS-English1.htm

Social Science Research Council: www.ssrc.org

Synergos Institute: www.synergos.org

UN Department for Political Affairs: www.un.org/Depts/dpa/normal.htm

UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (UNDP-BCPR): www.undp.org/erd/about.htm

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF): www.unicef.org

US ASEAN Business Council: www.us-asean.org

United States-Asia Environmental Partnership (US-AEP): www.usaep.org

United States-Indonesia Society: www.usindo.org

US Institute of Peace: www.usip.org

Volunteers in Asia: www.via.org

World Economic Forum: www.weforum.org

World Wildlife Foundation: www.wwf.org

Woodrow Wilson Center: www.wwics.si.edu

U.S. Government

Embassy of the United States of America in Jakarta: www.usembassyjakarta.org

U.S. Department of State: www.state.gov

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID): www.usaid.gov

USAID-Jakarta: www.usaid.gov/id

U.S. Dept. of Commerce – International Trade: www.ita.doc.gov

U.S. Chamber of Commerce: www.uschamber.com/International/Asia/default.htm
(Asia)

Consultants

Castle Group: www.castleasia.com

Chemonics International: www.chemonics.com

EurasiaGroup: www.eurasiagroup.net

Van Zorge & Heffernan: www.vanzorgereport.com

White & Case: www.whitecase.com

Indonesian Sites

Central Bureau of Statistics for the Republic of Indonesia (BPS): www.bps.go.id/index.shtml

Consulate General for the Republic of Indonesia, New York: www.indony.org

Indonesian Human Rights Network: www.indonesianetwork.org/index.html

The Jakarta Post: www.thejakartapost.com

Laskar Jihad: www.laskarjihad.or.id

LIPI (Indonesian Institute of Sciences): www.lipi.go.id

KEMALA (Environmental Organization): www.bsp-kemala.or.id

Komisi Hukum Nasional Republik Indonesia (Indonesian National Commission on Law):
www.komisihukum.go.id

Komnas HAM (The Indonesian National Commission on Human Rights)
www.komnasham.or.id

Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the UN
www.indonesiamission-ny.org

Sekretariat Dewan Pertimbangan Otonomi Daerah; www.otonomi.go.id

SMERU Research Institute: www.smeru.or.id

Support for Decentralization Measures (SfDM)—The Indonesian-German Development
Co-operation: www.gtzsfdm.or.id/about.htm

TAPOL (The Indonesia Human Rights Campaign): www.gn.apc.org/tapol

Tempo: www.tempo.co.id

WALHI (Friends of the Earth Indonesia): www.walhi.or.id