The objective of the conference was two-pronged: to determine critical 'push' factors that continue to sustain the conflict in Mindanao; and to identify policy recommendations to build a political and economic infrastructure that would help to contribute to lasting peace in Mindanao.
The following issues formed the backdrop for the daylong discussions among the participants on peace building in Mindanao:
Mindanao has been saddled with long-standing problems of economic underdevelopment; ethnic and religious divides; unmet demands for autonomy, social, political and cultural rights; as well as faced with an increasingly fragmented armed secessionist movement that includes varying political demands.
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S., there have been reports of alleged links between local armed separatists groups and al Qaeda, Abu Sayyaf, and Jemaah Islamiya. With the Philippines as a front-line state in the U.S.'s global war on terrorism, it now receives assistance from the U.S. government to end terrorism in the region.
More recently, the revival of peace negotiations between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which now includes discussions on ancestral lands, self-governance, and development in the region, has renewed hope for a long-term solution to the conflict.
Panel 1: Understanding the Roots of the Conflict: Social, Political and Economic Costs
The opening panel examined the historical roots and social costs of the on-going conflict in Mindanao and addressed how extreme poverty, political marginalization, and prolonged ethno-religious tensions have contributed to the complexity of the conflict through several decades. Panel speakers identified how local stakeholders, i.e. the Moros, non-Muslim indigenous communities, and Christian communities, as well as regional and international actors, have responded to mitigate the social costs of the conflict. Some of the panel speakers raised the importance of having an adequate understanding of what constitutes the Bangsamoro identity in order to contextualize the dynamics of political mobilization among the different political groups, as well as assess how development programs have had a differential impact among these groups.
A major cost of the conflict has been the displacement of the communities in the conflict zone. According to one panelist, 85 percent of the total number of people displaced by the on-going war between the armed opposition groups and the government forces are Moros. In 2000, the total number of internally displaced people (IDPs) reached 900,000 decreasing to 400,000 in 2003. Based on a social assessment study conducted by the World Bank, 50 percent of the IDPs indicated their unwillingness to return to their communities because of the absence of peace and security and economic options. Many civil society stakeholders are concerned about how aid money will be used, given the high degree of corruption in the country. To respond to this challenge, the World Bank in Southeast Asia has adopted a new approach by channeling the assistance directly to the community organizations. However, building trust and confidence among various stakeholders remains a challenge.
Panelists also cited examples of confidence-building measures within civil society. A recent example of positive engagement between the government and civil society occurred when the residents of a remote village in Mindanao were able to persuade the national office of the Department of Education to provide new teachers and new classrooms despite budgetary constraints. In another instance of community cooperation, religious leaders - both ulamas and bishops - initiated an inter-faith dialogue, with the help of local civil society groups, that addressed issues related to perceptions, misunderstanding and possible areas for building mutual trust.
Panel 2: The Secessionist Movement and the Challenges for Negotiating the Peace Process
This panel explored the various forms of engagement and the nature of dialogue between state and non-state actors who are currently involved in the peaceful settlement of conflict in Mindanao. It also addressed the core factors that continue to promote and hinder the implementation of the peace agreements. A major element is the fragmentation within the armed opposition groups, which challenges the design of a coherent or clearly defined conflict-resolution strategy.
Another potentially contentious issue that hinders a sustainable peace resolution in Mindanao is the failure of autonomy as an option for the Bangsamoro movement. Since the mid-1970s, two major peace initiatives (i.e., the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, and the 1996 Peace Agreement with the MNLF) that were based on the idea of political-administrative autonomy have already failed. These experiences have a bearing on the on-going peace negotiations with the MILF in terms of their buy-in of any new agreement that includes the issue of political autonomy. If this option fails, it is widely recognized that it will lead the MILF to push for complete independence and the establishment of a separate Islamic state.
Some other obstacles to the peace process include the split within the ranks of the leadership as well as the divisions within the Bangsamoro community, due to ideological differences or the prevalence of ethnic-based and clan-based conflicts. In addition, the Abu Sayyaf group's increasing notoriety as a terrorist group with Al Qaeda linkages has considerably affected the legitimacy of the Bangsamoro struggle in the public's perception. Since the upsurge of Abu Sayyaf's terror activities in 2000, there has been a growing tendency among the Filipino public to equate violence or terror with being a Muslim. This has also resulted in the Philippine military making little distinction between the MILF and the Abu Sayyaf in terms of their identities and the subsequent use of military force. As a result, the demands of the Bangsamoro have not gained widespread support across the country.
A major challenge for the Philippine state is to sustain its commitment to resolving the Mindanao conflict. One of the panel speakers considered the problem as more of a lack of political capability than political will from the Arroyo government. Owing to the government's lack of a solid political base, it is vulnerable to economic crises and strong-armed tactics by political opponents. This is further compounded by the Philippine legislature that is perceived to be insensitive to the conditions of the marginalized Filipino Muslims in Mindanao.
Panel 3: The Role of International Community: Policy Options and Alternatives
This final panel examined the critical role that various international actors play in drawing up short and long-term solutions to the conflict, given the increasing participation of local NGOs, the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism in Mindanao, and the U.S.'s war against terrorism. The panel also discussed policy recommendations that could build on current projects of international donor agencies and human rights organizations in the region as well as address new areas of concerns such as cultural pluralism and security reforms.
A key policy recommendation from the panelists focused on the state reforms in the security sector. Such efforts, however, needed to be directed towards greater professionalization rather than the mere modernization of the Philippine military. This would allow the U.S.'s technical assistance to be perceived more positively and a way for the US to make amends for its support of the Marcos regime.
Asset reforms also need to be undertaken in order to build the infrastructure for sustainable peace and to work toward the establishment of economically self-sufficient Bangsamoro communities. One speaker suggested that local development would lead to more capital, and in turn this would result in real growth and hence more autonomy for the Bangsamoro. In comparison, donor money and private capital poured into the region do not necessarily translate into significant economic change. As it is now, most of the aid money is channeled to building basic economic infrastructures (e.g., roads and solar powered dryers) that may not immediately lead to the creation of a huge economic base. Local control of resources by the Bangsamoro is critical to sustainable peace, which cannot be arrived at by simply the infusion of aid money.
Both the international community and the Philippine state should provide institutional support for strengthening cultural and educational institutions of the Bangsamoro communities as well as teaching them practical skills that will build their capacities for economic self-sufficiency. International donor agencies can help provide the conditions for cultural pluralism to flourish by drawing lessons learned from Malaysia and Indonesia where there is a "healthy marriage" of religious education and secular skills-based education, and by using these best practices to design programs in Mindanao.
Conclusion
The current peace process in Mindanao should be grounded in lessons learned from previous peace agreements as well as the failure of the implementation of the 1996 Peace Agreement. The apparent lack of trust in the current peace process as well as in the leading political actors and agencies involved has to be taken into account in framing peace policies and programs in the area. The future of the peace negotiation between the Philippine government and the MILF rests on the success and sustainability of current confidence-building measures initiated by both parties and the international community.
There is also a need to sustain as well as scale-up the on-going initiatives of MindaNews, USIP, World Bank and other international actors to facilitate a comprehensive approach towards a more enlightened, informed public discourse on the Mindanao conflict and complement 'talks" with real poverty-reduction, infrastructure-building projects in conflict-ridden areas in Mindanao. Critical issues such as human rights of the Bangsamoro and development in the region are not assumed to automatically or immediately resonate with the priorities of donor nations like the U.S. or the European Community. The final challenge for international non-state actors advocating for peace is reaching out and mobilizing public support among people who are not directly affected by the conflict.
Policy Recommendations
1. Reform in the security sector needs to serve the goals of strengthening and building stable, transparent, and accountable democratic institutions. Reforms should ensure that international norms of human rights, political accountability, civilian rule, the rule of law and legitimate force, and cultural pluralism become entrenched in the military, both in theory and in practice.
2. Strengthen the cultural institutions of the Bangsamoros and institutionalize cultural pluralism in the educational system.
3. Introduce institutional reforms that will strengthen democratic institutions and ensure the rule of law and respect for human rights, with particular focus on national institutions as well as in areas where Muslims are a majority or a significant minority, i.e., in the Autonomous Regions of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and other provinces in Mindanao. Philippine government agencies and non-government organization should explore the possibility of working with the Transparent and Accountable Governance Project to develop appropriate indicators and mechanisms for good governance in each province.
4. Solicit the support of migrant labor in financing community development in the area. The Philippine government should explore innovative approaches in
resource-generation such as encouraging Filipino migrant workers to invest
or channel a portion of their dollar remittances to financing effective community
development projects in the region.
5. Civil society organizations must be made robust, while taking into account that some civil society actors are either involved in or connected with armed opposition groups. This situation may continue to persist even with the best peace agreement.
6. Reach out to Bangsamoro youth and engage them in development and ceasefire monitoring. Their engagement in the process will not only inculcate values of inclusive participation and pluralism but will also help to discredit the stereotypes (i.e. "young Bangsamoros are prone to violence") prevalent among the general population. The expansion of educational and economic opportunities will ensure access to basic social services in Moro communities.
7. Invest in building the capacity of the Bangsamoro Development Authority and document milestones and lessons learned from current practice.
8. The peace process should also include asset and social reforms, both of which are essential to a lasting peace. Resolving questions of control over land and natural resources, provision of support services such as credit, farm inputs, etc. are critical to creating autonomous economic activities. USAID money needs to re-examine the design of its programs to consider these concerns.
9. Journalists and broadcasters, both at the local and national levels, should see themselves as peace-builders by providing the public with accurate and socially responsible reporting. Develop more initiatives to scale up Mindanews's efforts to cultivate responsible journalism and identify young Bangsamoros and people in Mindanao to be part of the expansion of these efforts.
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