Brigham Golden

Acknowledgement

First I would like to thank the Asia Society's Asian Social Issues Program (ASIP) for providing me with an opportunity to write critically and subtly about Papua. Over the years I have found that such opportunities are rare; the exotic fantasies of idyllic or savage Papuan primitives have just too much currency for most publishers to resist. It is a testament to the sensitivity and commitment of the Asian Social Issues Program that it would support an effort to write against these fantastical stereotypes-and against the destructive misunderstandings they engender.

Papua Misunderstood: Alienation, Conflict & the Anthropologist as Activist
Far removed from the main currents of human history, the western half of New Guinea-now known as the Indonesian province of Papua ¹ -has long been a mysterious and poorly understood region. In recent decades, however, Papua has become the object of powerful economic and political interests, and as a result, its land and people have suddenly encountered the orders and institutions of the modern world: government, urbanization, technology, mass media, industrial resource extraction, cash currency, commodities. Tragically, these forces have overwhelmed Papua, marginalizing its people and generating a vicious cycle of alienation and conflict. Papua is now widely known as one of Asia's "hot spots".

Yet despite the increased attention it has received as a conflict zone, Papua remains profoundly misunderstood. And misunderstandings about Papua are crucial because they actually fuel the region's cycle of alienation and conflict. They do so by obscuring the cycle's catalysts and by undermining even the best intentions to stop it. Indeed, until these misunderstandings are dispelled, there is little hope for positive developments in the transformation of remote Papua as it encounters the modern world.

Often at the frontier of modernity's incursions into the remote places of the earth are anthropologists-like myself-whose academic research involves "indigenous" communities. And in Papua, where misperceptions are not simply matters of academic debate, anthropologists are forced to confront a difficult decision: whether or not to actively use our knowledge to improve the lives of those we study. As witness to suffering and conflict, the anthropologist who works in Papua must ultimately decide.

This text is my response to that decision: an attempt to dispel two crucial misconceptions about Papua that drive alienation and conflict while prohibiting positive change. This is what an "activist" Anthropology could be-a commitment to publicly challenging the issues that drive conflict-and it is, I would argue, a moral imperative for those conducting anthropological research in a place like Papua. Thankfully, there are others who feel as I do.

Papua Understood: Fostering Peace and Prosperity
Unfortunately, misconceptions about Papua are not easily dispelled. Many of the region's problems are quite difficult to understand-emerging from a complex and sometimes bizarre interplay between local culture and modern political-economies. These problems are analogous to those of indigenous communities in other nations, such as Brazil, Australia and the United States, where they have proven extremely difficult to understand and overcome. Other problems in Papua, however, remain unidentified despite the fact that they are pandemic in Indonesia, a sprawling nation undergoing a fitful transition to democracy and still staggering from the economic crisis of the late 1990's. Many of these problems are not being acknowledged or addressed because powerful interests seek to hide them from the public eye.

The following pages therefore focus on two specific issues that are not widely understood, but are critical to Papua's future. The first relates to the Papuan concept of merdeka, which is commonly understood as an ideology of political independence, but which is in fact a more profound and ambitious aspiration-analogous to a 'liberation theology'. Papua's merdeka movement is a moral crusade for peace and social justice on earth, and the tremendous depth and breadth of its popularity must be understood as emerging from the region's long history of millenarian movements. The second issue is a dangerous and disturbing economy in which factions of the Indonesian Government and the local Papuan community have vested interest in perpetuating conflict in Papua-a phenomenon I call the economy of conflict. In contemporary Indonesia this economy is not unique to Papua; but nowhere in Indonesia is this economy more destructive or profitable.

Awareness of these two issues should inform and shape initiatives by key stakeholders in Papua: first and foremost the Indonesian government, but also religious institutions, donor agencies and the NGO community. Indeed, until their programs and policies demonstrate conviction in meeting the moral demands of merdeka and stopping the economy of conflict, all efforts to foster peace and to build a vibrant civil society in Papua are sure to fail. To succeed in these respects would also serve the Indonesian Government's efforts to invite a deeply alienated ethnic Papuan community into its national project-an essential development if peace is to be achieved in the foreseeable future.

This last point must be elaborated-because conflict in Papua is so often viewed as hinging on the political status of the territory. In my opinion, Indonesia's claims to the region are legitimated only by its success in bringing peace, democracy, opportunity, and social justice to its citizens in Papua-indeed, in achieving the moral tenets of merdeka. But to my mind Papua represents an even more profound test to Indonesia; for I believe the success of Indonesia as a national democracy will forever be measurable by the condition of Papua-as the place where race, religion and culture diverge most dramatically from the Javanese standard, and where rich natural wealth most tempts the greed of those who would take advantage of marginalized people. By fostering peace and justice in Papua, Indonesia would take a tremendous step towards becoming one of the world's great pluralist democracies. To fail would be a sure and dangerous step toward national dissolution.

Papua Merdeka-Millenarianism Becomes Politics
While the Malay word merdeka is familiar to most Indonesians as a nationalistic rallying cry from their revolution against Dutch colonialism in the years following WWII, the word has developed a peculiar and profound significance in Papua. Often translated as "political independence", a more apt rendering of the word in its Papuan context might be "freedom" or "liberation".

But even these words do not capture the term, which holds a sublime-almost spiritual-significance for ethnic Papuans. Indeed, asking a Papuan about the meaning of merdeka is likely to provoke the florid language and the far away gaze of a utopian vision. Transcending a nationalist aspiration in the modern sense, merdeka is a far more profound vision of worldly emancipation: from injustice, violence, subjugation, destitution, racial discrimination-even from an unfortunate shame that many seem to feel regarding their own "primitive" past. It is this powerful vision-whose Christian overtones suggest a sort of liberation theology-that drives the deep and widespread support for merdeka among ethnic Papuans. In a land of over two hundred distinct tribal groups, merdeka is, and will likely remain, the one concept that unites virtually all Papuans.

But the fervent popularity of merdeka in Papua can only be understood as emerging from the region's well-documented history of millenarian movements-infamously known as "cargo cults". Like cargo cults, merdeka is a passionate desire for moral and physical liberation born out of a profound sense of impotence in the face of overwhelming political and economic powers. History has shown that these kinds of millenarian movements are dangerous because they inspire both wildly idealistic expectations, and the willingness to sacrifice everything to achieve them. However, only the moral foundation of merdeka can explain why the movement in Papua has been-thus far-so explicitly non-violent.

Understanding the moral and millennial roots of merdeka is absolutely crucial to the success of any initiatives promoting peace and civil society in the region. For example, Jakarta's policy of "Special Autonomy" for Papua has been presented as a mutually exclusive alternative to merdeka, and as a result, has been widely rejected by ethnic Papuans. However, if "autonomy" could be socialized and implemented in such a way as to explicitly serve the moral goals of merdeka-for example, by developing a truth and justice commission, reducing repressive measures by security forces, combating structural racism in the public and private sectors, and giving Papuan tribal institutions a role in the Provincial administration-then it could certainly provide a crucial step towards resolving the political deadlock in Papua.

All this is not to imply that Papuans lack a sense of the controversies regarding their political history, nor that political history has nothing to do with merdeka. Indeed, Papuans-even in remote areas-often discuss their political history with a sophistication that is striking. Also striking are the similarities of these discussions throughout Papua. Invariably Papuans express their history as a narrative of exclusion and dehumanization on a mythic scale. It is a story in which Papuans were not invited to sit at a table to discuss their fate, and thus became less than human. This narrative also indicates the peculiarly Papuan and distinctively millenarian qualities of merdeka's aspirations. Merdeka is not simply a request for self determination in the political sense, but a demand to be included in reciprocal dialogue with the powers of the globe-and in so doing, to gain the dignity of being human. Though tremendously diverse culturally, people throughout Papua seem to share a fundamental belief that the open forum of communication and exchange is the single most important human activity. Indeed to "sit and talk together" (duduk dan bicara bersama) is the mode through which relationships are formed and communities are bound together. The Papuan obsession with "straightening" (meluruskan) history expresses a profound desire to be recognized by global powers that they feel have never acknowledged their existence: Indonesia, the Netherlands, the United States, and the United Nations. To sit at the table with these powers, and to be heard, is a crucial aspect of merdeka.

Ultimately, merdeka is a supra-political ideology in Papua-which is perhaps to say it is cultural. Certainly it is both more and less than a struggle for political independence. For this reason I believe that both the apparent contradictions of 'independence without merdeka' and 'merdeka without independence' are possible. Jakarta's goal should be the latter, but to achieve that goal it must be capable of truly and explicitly addressing the moral aspirations of merdeka through its policies and institutions. Until this occurs, there is little hope for resolution in Papua. Further, as long as the term is understood by Jakarta only as a threat to nationalist symbols or political sovereignty, the government will ignore and even violate the very moral tenants that could form the basis of compromise. In this way Jakarta would ensure that merdeka comes to signify only "political independence" and thus ensure its nightmare of disintegration.

Papua and the Economy of Conflict
On August 31, 2002 near Tembagapura, gunfire burst from the jungle-strafing a convoy of cars belonging to the American mining corporation Freeport McMoRan. Eleven employees were injured and three were killed-including two Americans. Immediately following the attack, the Indonesian military, which holds a multi-million dollar security contract with Freeport, accused Papuan "separatists" and increased deployments around the mine. Within weeks, however, both Indonesian police and U.S. investigators had publicly suggested that military units were the likely culprits, and the attack may have been an attempt to boost their security contract.

Though this attack has sparked a great deal of controversy-particularly with respect to the debate over U.S. ties with the Indonesian military-it illustrates a poorly understood phenomenon that drives conflict in Papua. This phenomenon I call the economy of conflict. In this economy, organizations and individuals have a vested interest in perpetuating instability in Papua. To understand this economy it is essential to scrutinize Indonesia's armed forces, also known as the TNI.

It is widely believed that the huge and fractious TNI generates more than seventy percent of its income from "off-budget" operations, including extortion rackets, illegal mining and logging, and traffic in prostitution, narcotics and endangered species. As troop deployments that spawn these "businesses" are determined by security conditions, the TNI has a vested interest in perpetuating conflict in lucrative regions. It is the fundamental irony of contemporary Indonesia that the institution charged with maintaining national security is precisely the institution with the interest and capacity to perpetuate instability.

Isolated and rich in natural resources, Papua is a major theater for the economy of conflict, and indeed, elements of the TNI have pursued instability aggressively there in recent years. In western towns, TNI units have actively supported the spread of Laskar Jihad, a radical Islamicist militia, and the Barisan Merah-Putih, a nationalist militia with racist overtones, intending to provoke sectarian clashes between ethnic Papuan Christians and migrant Malay Muslims. The TNI has also strongly promoted a controversial plan to divide Papua into three separate provinces, a plan that is extremely likely to spark regional and ethnic conflict over unequally-distributed resources.

But the TNI's principal task is to maintain territorial integrity, and thus the TNI has sought to cast its role in Papua as a battle against violent secessionists. Surprisingly, this has not been so easily achieved. The broad-based anti-violence movement in Papua-which is an aspect of merdeka's moral crusade-has been tremendously successful in preventing widespread conflict. Indeed, a senior TNI commander recently stated that Papua was proving difficult for them because Papuans refuse to use violence in their quest for merdeka. Nevertheless, elements of the TNI have sought to radicalize the merdeka movement through a variety of repressive and covert strategies. Most notably, they have sought to incite Papuans and derail dialogue-based reconciliation initiatives by targeting peaceful leaders of the merdeka movement, such as Theys Eluay, Chairman of the Papuan Presidium Council, who was assassinated by Special Forces troops in 2001.

But the TNI is not alone in pursuing the economy of conflict in Papua. In their efforts to radicalize the merdeka movement, elements of the TNI have developed covert symbiotic relationships with Papuan radicals who are their supposed "enemies". Indeed, a significant percentage of so-called OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka) guerillas have economic and operational links to the TNI-sharing also their extortionist relationships with local business interests. This kind of perverse cooperation appears to be behind a recent attack upon a military barracks in Wamena that resulted in three deaths and the theft of 29 automatic rifles-a dramatic escalation of the conflict in Papua. Though the TNI immediately accused the OPM and reinforced its deployments in the region, public admissions by senior TNI officials that soldiers may have been involved is a positive sign that this perverse symbiosis at a local level may not be tolerated by the TNI hierarchy.

Ultimately, a fundamental reform of the security sector in which the TNI's domestic security functions are replaced with an organic police force, and legal accountability is established for officers, is absolutely crucial to stopping the economy of conflict in Papua. By ignoring such reforms Indonesia risks an escalating conflict in Papua that will not only fuel alienation and secessionism among ethnic Papuans, but which could indeed threaten democratization and stability throughout the archipelago.

Conclusion
Misunderstandings about merdeka and the economy of conflict contribute in real ways to the brutal cycle of alienation and conflict in Papua. Indeed, as long as merdeka is interpreted only as a threat to national security and individuals that benefit from instability remain unchallenged, this cycle will continue and all efforts to ease Papua's encounter with the modern world will fail. Such failure will ensure a tragedy in Papua that will have repercussions throughout the region, while standing as a tremendous loss to Indonesia, and indeed, to all humanity.

To be an anthropologist in Papua entails a challenge to respond as an activist. As the effects of misunderstandings have become tragically clear to me, so too has my method of engagement. It is my sincerest hope that promoting a better understanding of Papua will help to bring peace and prosperity in this uniquely beautiful region.

Endnotes

1. The complexity of Papua's brief political history is illustrated by its names. In the 20th century alone, the region held six designations: Netherlands New Guinea, West New Guinea, West Papua, West Irian, Irian Jaya, and Papua. Three of these names are currently in use, each reflecting distinct claims regarding the territory's political status: "West Papua" implies a refusal of Indonesia's territorial authority-as it would be the title of an independent state should secession occur; "Irian Jaya"-though still an officially sanctioned name for the Province-implies allegiance with Indonesia's centralized management of the region; and "Papua", a new official name, expresses sympathy with decentralization and local ethno-cultural distinctiveness. In my opinion, the name "Papua", which was approved by the Indonesian legislature in 2001, represents an important compromise.

BIBLIOGRAPHY / FURTHER READINGS

Aditjondro, George. 2002. "Dari Gaharu ke Eksplosi HIV/AIDS: Dampak Bisnis Kelabu Tentara di Tanah Papua". Jakarta: unpublished.

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Council on Foreign Relations. 2003. Indonesia Commission: Peace and Progress in Papua. New York/Jakarta: CFR.

Golden, Brigham 2002. "Stirring up things can be good business", International Herald Tribune, October 2. London.

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Rhys, Lloyd. 1947. Jungle Pimpernel, London: Hodder and Stoughton.

Rutherford, Danilyn. 2003. Raiding the Land of the Foreigners: The Limits of the Nation on an Indonesian Frontier. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press.

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BRIGHAM GOLDEN is completing a doctoral thesis about Freeport McMoRan in Columbia University's Department of Anthropology. Mr. Golden has spent six of the last ten years in Indonesia, primarily in Jakarta and Papua. He is engaged in efforts to promote peace and social development in Papua through the Council on Foreign Relations' Task Force on Papua and the New York-based Papua Resource Center.