As in the 1986 People Power, the role of the military in this year’s uprising proved crucial. It was only after the withdrawal of the support by the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police on January 19, 2001 that the Supreme Court declared the Office of the President vacant. In the 1986 People Power, military support was believed to be the primary factor that led to the removal of Marcos. Political leaders as well as members of the military who eventually renounced Marcos were perceived and treated by the public as heroes. That same accolade was given to government officials and military leaders who withdrew their support from Estrada.

There are several pressing issues confronting the new president: rumors of a coup d'état; constitutional challenges to the legitimacy of her presidency; the prosecution of former President Estrada for graft and corruption; socio-economic reforms; restoring public trust; prevalent kidnappings all over the country; and the armed conflict in Mindanao. Human rights groups are urging the present administration to file violations of human rights and war crimes cases against Estrada for initiating war against Moro rebels in Central Mindanao.³ Leaders of non-governmental organizations also press for the establishment of an independent commission to investigate cases of plunder, graft and corruption and human rights violations committed by Estrada.⁴ There are arguments that the prosecution of cases against Estrada should be prioritized to prevent the destruction of evidence and to preclude him from using his alleged ill-gotten financial resources to destabilize the new government.⁵

In the face of numerous political, social and economic issues that compete for attention and solution, the present administration should not overlook one particular sector of the population: the human rights victims during the Marcos regime. Although People Power II made possible the peaceful transition of leadership, the fact that it had to happen again is a sign that People Power I did not fully achieve its purpose. The legacy of the Marcos administration, in terms of lack of accountability of public officials who participated in or condoned his policies, is still evident up to now and is manifested in several ways. The reconciliation that transpired in 1986 between the Marcos-led military and public officials on one hand and the public on the other, was merely superficial and achieved with a heavy price. Reconciliation was prioritized more than the need to acknowledge the "truth" as to the violations and atrocities that transpired during the Marcos regime. In the name of political survival, peace and gratitude, the public officials and members of the military who were in complicity with Marcos during his term were "forgiven" for subsequently denouncing him and supporting the 1986 People Power. They were treated by the public as heroes and the success of the mass protest was attributed to their eventual support. Meanwhile, "justice" for the human rights victims, in terms of acknowledging their sufferings, identifying and punishing the perpetrators, and providing compensation, was relegated into the background by subsequent administrations. The recent political crisis experienced by the Philippines demonstrates that reconciliation and truth must be pursued by the government both concurrently and actively. Prioritizing one in favor of the other, even if necessary for present political survival or stability, results in further conflicts and crisis in the long run.

In this regard, this paper aims to analyze the need to establish a truth commission in the Philippines for the human rights violations committed during the Marcos regime. Parts II and III provide a brief background of the violations committed and substantiate why priority should be given to the human rights victims during the Marcos administration. Part IV examines the outcome of efforts made at both national and international levels to address the needs of the victims and their families. Part V recommends the integration of the functions of a truth commission into the work of an existing government institution and Part VI discusses the main focus and priority of the commission and, followed by conclusions in Part VII.

II. Brief Historical Background

Marcos was elected president in 1965 and re-elected in 1969. In order to perpetuate himself in office, he issued Proclamation No. 1081 on September 21, 1972 which suspended the Constitution and imposed martial law. During martial law, Marcos, his daughter Imee Marcos, and the armed forces chief of staff General Fabian Ver, directed the operations of the military. The following government bodies: the Philippine Army; Armed Forces of the Philippines; Philippine Constabulary; Civilian Home Defense Force; Composite Infantry Battalion; National Intelligence Security Agency; Military Intelligence Group; and Barrio/Barangay Self-Defense Unit, were involved in human rights abuses, ⁷ with 3,257 killed, 35,000 tortured, and 70,000 incarcerated. ⁸ The victims included members of the opposition political groups; journalists and publishers; delegates of the Constitutional Convention protesting the extension of Marcos’ term; student leaders and activists; academicians; and labor organizers, persons who protested against the injustices perpetrated or condoned by Marcos. ⁹ In response to the widespread fraud, vote-buying, intimidation and violence during presidential elections in 1986, where Marcos declared himself the winner, a civilian mass protest took shape. It was led by Corazon C. Aquino, widow of assassinated political leader Benigno Aquino, and the candidate who ran against Marcos during the elections. The term of Marcos ended in February 25, 1986, when he and his family left the country for Hawaii. Aquino was sworn in as the next president.

III. Prioritizing Marcos Human Rights Victims

When human rights violations continue from one administration to another and are committed by both state and non-state actors, a decision to prioritize and address the needs of one group over the other is subject to criticism. In the Philippines, the violations committed by the military and paramilitary during the Marcos regime continued long after he was deposed. From 1988 to 1998, the Commission on Human Rights received 15,556 complaints of human rights violations under the three post-Marcos administrations.¹⁰ Communist and Muslim rebels also committed offenses against civilians and members of the military in their political struggle against the government. Another serious concern is the general population directly and indirectly affected by the economic policies and massive corruption committed by Marcos and public officials during his administration. Defending the preference given to a specific category of victims over a more general group of disadvantaged citizens is more complex when the policies of the prior administration resulted in both poverty and human rights abuse, ¹¹ as in the case of the Philippines. Although it is difficult to prioritize one group of victims over the other, the present administration should not regress from its obligation to address the long-delayed "justice" due to the Marcos human rights victims. There are several reasons why preference should be given to this group of victims: First, government agencies, primarily the military and police, were used by Marcos to violate the rights of his constituencies. These institutions, with a mandate to protect and preserve the rights of people, were used as instruments of terror. ¹² The violations that occurred after Marcos were not part of State policy nor did the succeeding administrations personally order or condone the commission of human rights abuses. Second, compared with violence committed by non-state actors, State violence is more cruel and malevolent as the victims cannot rely on the State to provide redress. Victims of non-state actors have legal recourse for redress of grievances not available to victims of state violence. ¹³ Third, the violations occurred fifteen years ago during a fourteen-year spread, from 1972 to 1986. The passage of time makes it imperative for the present administration to address the concerns of the Marcos victims and their families as soon as possible and while they are still alive. In providing redress to human rights victims of previous administrations, several countries, including Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, South Africa, and Uganda, have resorted to the truth commissions. Will the establishment of such a commission in the future provide an appropriate and adequate remedy to the Marcos victims?

IV. Assessing the Need for a Truth Commission

Truth commissions are usually created during political transitions to emphasize the break with the past and to promote national reconciliation. ¹⁴Fifteen years after the end of the Marcos regime, is there a need to establish a truth commission in the Philippines to address the needs of human rights victims? To answer this question, it is necessary to look at the purpose of such a commission and analyze whether government and private efforts undertaken at both the domestic and international levels were able to achieve the same objective. A truth commission can determine what happened to individual victims and at the same time analyze the broader pattern of abuse by investigating the mechanisms and institutions that enable abuses to occur. ¹⁵ The commissions often serve four primary purposes: "(1) to establish an historic record; (2) to obtain justice for the victims; (3) to facilitate national reconciliation; and (4) to deter further violations and abuses." ¹⁶ Truth commissions also serve the following important functions with respect to criminal prosecutions: building a foundation to subsequent judicial action; establishing a complete historical record of abuses victims, and perpetrators; and ensuring that in cases where it is necessary to defer prosecutions, justice is not forfeited completely. ¹⁷ However, the objectives of truth commissions may be achieved through other means. With respect to the Marcos victims, efforts were undertaken both at the local and international levels to achieve the same results. Before proposing the establishment of a truth commission, it is first essential to determine the following: First, did efforts undertaken at the national and international levels accomplish their objectives in order to avoid duplication and overlapping of functions? Second, were the results achieved adequate to redress the injuries suffered by the victims?

A. Efforts at the National Level

One of the first acts of President Corazon Aquino when she assumed office after Marcos was the creation of a seven-member Presidential Committee on Human Rights (PCHR) with a mandate to:

investigate complaints it may receive, cases known to it or to its members, and such cases as the Presidency may, from time to time, assign to it, of unexplained disappearances, extra-judicial killings ("salvaging"), massacres, torture, hamletting, food blockades and other violations of human rights, past or present, committed by officers or agents of the national government or persons acting in their place or stead or under their orders express or implied.¹⁸

The PCHR, serving the functions of a truth commission, was under the jurisdiction of the Office of the President as an "advisory and consultative body," without prosecutorial powers. ¹⁹ Since the coverage of its investigation was quite broad, its first chairman, Senator Jose W. Diokno, limited the investigation to abuses perpetrated by "government officers or their agents, or by persons acting in their stead or under their orders." ²⁰

The PCHR was further directed to undertake the following tasks: submit a report of its findings to the president; to publicize the report; recommend a system for the government to compensate the victims and punish the perpetrators; and propose mechanisms to prevent further commission of violations by officers or agents of the government. To fulfill its mandate, the PCHR was given the following powers: issue subpoenas to the hearings; grant immunity from prosecution to persons whose testimonies were necessary for its investigation, and request government agencies for assistance. ²¹

Aside from the inadequate number of staff and budget and the overwhelming number of complaints it received, the PCHR’s efforts were seriously limited by the existing political context existing after the 1986 revolution. ²² First, the military was still a powerful institution and it played a crucial role in overthrowing Marcos in 1986. It was perceived that the People’s Power would not have been successful without the support of the military led by Juan Ponce Enrile and Fidel V. Ramos, who were the defense minister and Armed Forces of the Philippines, respectively, at that time. ²³ Members of the military who denounced Marcos and supported the mass protest became popular heroes in the collective consciousness of the masses. ²⁴ Public gratitude was reflected in the policy of the Aquino administration when it came to "recognizing" and "accounting" the human rights abuses perpetrated by the military and police during the martial law. Her administration’s policy was not to deal with it at all knowing that Enrile and Ramos played major roles during the martial law. The military apparatus remained virtually intact during the Aquino administration and she even appointed Enrile as Defense Minister and promoted Ramos as Armed Forces Chief of Staff. ²⁵ Ramos was eventually elected President in 1992, with Aquino’s endorsement, and Enrile was elected to the Senate of the Philippines. Second, the repressive laws passed by Marcos were still in effect and seriously restricted the work of the PCHR. Presidential Decree Nos. 1822 and 1850 provided for exclusive trial by the military courts of members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Integrated National Police (INP) charged with any crime even if their victims were civilians. ²⁶ Since the military establishment and courts do not usually grant access to judicial records, an investigation of human rights cases filed against military personnel proved difficult. Information on the number of human rights abuses in contrast to petty crimes and the ranks and designations of dismissed or convicted soldiers were not available. These decrees made it difficult for civilians to expect a fair trial when they initiate cases against members of the military since there is the possibility of a cover-up due to esprit de corps within the military and to protect the image of the institution itself. ²⁷ Even though these repressive laws were subsequently repealed in 1991, ²⁸ it proved too late to contribute to the work of the PCHR. In January 1987, practically all members of the PCHR resigned after the military attacked a peaceful demonstration in Manila, killing several civilians. Despite a year of investigation and the filing of cases against high-level public officials, the work of the committee was cut short and it never issued a final report. ²⁹ The PCHR was eventually replaced by the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) in 1988 by virtue of Executive Order No. 163 and Section 17, Article 13 of the 1987 Constitution. ³⁰ No efforts were made by the succeeding administrations to follow-up the investigation and the work initiated by the PCHR. ³¹ One possible reason is the existence of a class action suit initiated by victims and their families in the United States.

B. Efforts at the International Level³²

One month after the Marcoses arrived in Hawaii, five lawsuits³³ were filed against Marcos, his daughter Imee, and the armed forces chief of staff, General Fabian Ver in three different judicial districts in the United States. ³⁴ More than 10,000 persons arrested, tortured, and executed between 1971 and 1986³⁵ filed suits based on the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) ³⁶ which grants federal district courts "original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." ³⁷

All the cases were consolidated and certified as a class action on April 8, 1991. ³⁸ The Estate, represented by his widow, Imelda R. Marcos and son, Ferdinand E. Marcos, Jr., was substituted for Marcos when he died on September 28, 1989. ³⁹ The jury found the defendants liable to the plaintiffs for the acts of torture, summary execution and disappearance. On February 23, 1994, the jury awarded $1.2 billion as exemplary damages. ⁴⁰ On January 20, 1995 over $766 million were awarded as compensatory damage for the class, with individual plaintiffs’ awards ranging from $150,000.00 to $700,000.00. ⁴¹ In spite of the huge award, the case suffered from the following limitations:

1. Since ATCA is a civil action, no criminal responsibility was attached to the jury’s findings that Marcos was liable⁴² for the acts of torture, summary execution and disappearance.
2. Due to jurisdictional limitations, the U.S. court’s authority did not extend to the members of the military in the Philippines who were directly and personally involved in carrying out the orders of Marcos. The persons who actually executed the orders were not identified during the proceedings.
3. Since the U.S. foreign sovereign immunity law barred the plaintiffs from naming the Republic of the Philippines as a defendant, the plaintiffs had sued Marcos only in his individual and private capacity even though the government of the Philippines also bear responsibility for the human rights violations⁴³ committed by state actors.
4. There were several restrictions to the litigation in the U.S.: First, not all of the plaintiffs were able to personally narrate their stories. The jury reviewed depositions of 137 plaintiffs and heard the live testimony of several class members who were able to come to the U.S. ⁴⁴ Second, only few plaintiffs observed the trial and third, they were not able to confront the perpetrators face to face. These proceedings are very important in assisting the victims and their family to process their experience and help bring "closure" to the pains they have suffered.
5. When the jury came out with nearly $2 billion in damages, the size of the award is in recognition of Marcos’ primary liability for the violations committed against the plaintiffs. However, five years after the damages were awarded, plaintiffs’ counsels were able to seize only $1 million of Marcos’ assets. ⁴⁵ The possibility of obtaining even a portion of the award, when the victims rely solely on the enforcement of the U.S. judgment, is minimal.

V. Establishing a Truth Commission

Although efforts were made at the national and international levels to address the abuses committed by the Marcos administration through the establishment of the PCHR and the filing a case in the United States, these actions proved inadequate in terms of accounting for the country’s "past" and more importantly, providing concrete "justice" to the victims. The political crisis that the Philippines experienced this year is a sign that the "lack of accounting" by the post-Marcos administrations affected the political and socio-economic stability of the country even fifteen years after the rule of Marcos ended. This shortcoming may be remedied by the present administration through the establishment of a truth commission.

There are practical matters that should be taken into consideration when establishing a truth commission. Financial consideration is one of them. It is an important factor for the Philippines, a country beset by socio-economic problems caused by economic mismanagement and graft and corruption. The financial resources involved in establishing and operating a truth commission may be reduced if its functions are undertaken by an existing government agency. Although the government may request for financial assistance from international institutions and foreign governments, there are several factors against this move. First, since the abuses occurred fifteen years ago, it is an urgent matter and processing requests for assistance from foreign sources may only delay its establishment. Second, the government should acknowledge its primary responsibility for violations committed by State actors even if the present administration was not involved in the past abuses. Third, using an existing government agency to function as a truth commission reduces the financial burden on the national budget and the time frame necessary in establishing such a commission. The work several non-governmental organizations involved in assisting the victims also lessens the work of the commission, enabling it to achieve results in a relatively short period of time.

The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) which replaced the PCHR is the ideal institution to undertake the functions of a truth commission. The creation of the CHR was provided for under Article 13, Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution. The powers and functions of the CHR include the following:

• Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights;
• Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines;
• Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;
• Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority.

As a constitutional body, the CHR enjoys independence from the government bureaucracy and may effectively resist any influence or pressure from the Marcos family or the military institution. The CHR also operates nationwide and this is an important aspect for a truth commission, to reach all the victims as the abuses were not concentrated in one particular area of the country.

In order for the CHR to function as a truth commission as effectively and efficiently as possible, it must involve civil society, religious institutions and local non-governmental organizations in its work. When the post-Marcos administrations relegated into the background the concerns of the human rights victims, it is these groups and organizations that took over and shouldered the duties that belong to the government in the first place. Important data, information, contact with the victims and social services were provided by these groups and since the objectives of the truth commission must be achieved as soon as possible if it is to be relevant to the surviving victims and families, their cooperation must be sought by the government in the administration of the commission.

VI. Focus: Financial Reparation

The establishment of a compensation program for the victims should be the most important and immediate task of the commission given the fact that the abuses occurred fifteen years ago during a fourteen-year spread. This paper proposes that compensation to the victims and their families be directly provided by the Philippine government by virtue of its obligations under international and domestic law. The right of victims of human rights abuses to receive compensation for injuries they suffered at the hands of State actors is established under international human rights law, specifically, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment at:http://hei.unige.ch/humanrts/instree/h2catoc.htm. ⁴⁶ The Philippines is obligated to provide compensation by virtue of its membership in the United Nations and by ratifying the aforesaid instruments. The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines also recognizes this obligation under Article III, Section 12, paragraph 4 which provides that: "The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to the rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families."

The fact that the abuses occurred during the administration of Marcos from 1972 to 1986 does not excuse the succeeding administrations, especially the present one, from responsibility. The military and the police were used to perpetrate abuses, and even though Marcos was sued in the U.S. in his personal capacity, the Philippine government bears responsibility for the abuses committed during his time. Aside from Marcos, many government officials, specifically from the military, share responsibility for the atrocities committed by personally carrying out the orders of Marcos. ⁴⁷ Under the international law principles of state responsibility, a state is responsible for failing to prevent or respond adequately to human rights violations in its territory committed by purely private parties or agents of a foreign government, and this responsibility is more evident when the offender is a government official or a private person acting as an agent of the government. ⁴⁸ In this case, the fact that the atrocities were ordered by the highest public official in the country is not an excuse for the subsequent administrations to deny liability. The duty of a state to pay compensation applies to the new government that replaced the government responsible for the abuses under the "principle of the continuity of the State in international law." ⁴⁹ Under the international principle that "the new regime takes the place of the former regime in all matters affecting the international rights and obligations of the State," ⁵⁰ the present administration has the obligation to provide compensation to the victims. Aside from the international and domestic laws, there are several important reasons why it is the government itself that should establish and provide for compensation instead of relying on the U.S. award:

1. The U.S. award failed to consider that whatever compensation is awarded by the Marcos Estate originates from the assets plundered from the nation in the first place. Even assuming that the Estate owns properties worth $2.9 billion and the victims were able to enforce the entire amount or even a portion of it, the assets can be traced from the widespread and systematic theft of funds and properties belonging to the Philippine government and the Filipino people. ⁵¹ Technically, if the Marcoses are able to comply with the judgment, they will be using money appropriated from the government in the first place.
2. There are conflicts in the domestic level if compensation is to be based on the U.S. judgment. There is a domestic law that directs all recovered ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses to the agrarian reform program, ⁵² precluding the victims from enforcing the U.S. judgment. Even if the victims were the ones who made the effort to identify and trace portions of the assets, the Philippine government represents conflicting claims. The Sandiganbayan⁵³ also rendered a decision declaring that payment of the direct, primary and personal liabilities to the human rights claimants should come from the personal funds of the Marcoses. ⁵⁴ Hence, the court awarded $627.6 million traced to the Marcoses to the government instead of the victims. ⁵⁵
3. Another reason why it is the government that should provide compensation is to prevent a division between the victims. In 1999, the plaintiffs agreed to a settlement of $150 million. The settlement split the human rights plaintiffs into two factions, one group denounced the settlement as "unjust, illegal and immoral" ⁵⁶ while the group in favor of the settlement justified it due to the fact that many of the victims were already dying penniless. ⁵⁷ This split lessens the possibility of the enforcement of the judgment since there is a disagreement among the victims as to the amount to be pursued, the entire $2 billion or a portion of it.
4. The victims, as non-state actors, do not have the same leverage and legitimacy in dealing with foreign jurisdictions, i.e. Switzerland, where a large portion of the Marcos assets is hidden. The domestic laws and agreements concluded with these foreign countries also limit the enforceability of the judgment. Switzerland's negotiations with another state, which in this case is the Philippine government, will always defeat subsequent civil judgments, i.e. the U.S. A.T.C.A. case filed by the victims, under the act of state doctrine. ⁵⁸ In 1986, the Swiss government agreed that the assets would be returned to the Philippines if criminal prosecutions against the Marcos family in the Philippines succeeded⁵⁹ and the Swiss Federal Supreme Court ruled that the human rights claimants may only seek redress from the Philippine judicial system. ⁶⁰
5. In order to prevent distortion of the country’s history and to protect the "rule of law" in prosecuting the Marcos heirs in the future, the government must recognize its responsibility in instituting reparation programs independent of the U.S. judgment. Further compromise agreements by the victims and the government with the Marcos Estate is equivalent to surrendering "justice" and part of the nation’s sovereignty, in terms of seeking accountability, admission of wrongs committed, and prosecution for offenses committed by the Marcoses. When the victims themselves entered into a compromise agreement with the Estate, Imelda Marcos called the move by the victims to enforce the award from the Marcos Estate a "'conspiracy of vultures" and she added that she had agreed to the payment of the $150 million settlement in the interests of ''peace, unity and reconciliation'' and "not (as) damages but a donation." ⁶¹ Her son, Marcos, Jr., further added that the plaintiffs were "victims of their own greed" and that: "[t]hey don’t want justice, they want money." ⁶² The Hawaiian district court even upheld the provisions absolving the Marcos heirs of human rights violations and granting them immunity from future suits. ⁶³
6. The most important factor why the government should provide for compensation is the long period of time it would take to recover the hidden assets of the Marcoses given the abovementioned factors involved. If the government would merely rely on the enforcement of the U.S. judgment, then there is the possibility that only few of the more than 10,000 victims and their families will live long enough to see that compensation is received and they actually benefit from it.

VII. Conclusion

The recent political crisis that the Philippines experienced requires a re-examination of history. The fact that People Power II happened fifteen years after the first one signals that not all of the objectives were achieved by the first mass protest. The price of reconciliation between the public and the military institutions that perpetrated or condoned human rights abuses were achieved by neglecting the "truth" and "justice" for the human rights victims during the Marcos regime. Although governmental and private efforts were made at the national and international levels to address the abuses through the establishment of the PCHR and the filing of a case in the United States, such efforts proved to be inadequate. It is necessary to establish a truth commission in order to provide for a complete and public historical account of the violations that transpired during the Marcos regime and to provide concrete "justice" for the victims. The establishment of a financial compensation program for the victims is the most immediate and important goal of the commission given the fact that the abuses occurred fifteen years ago.

NOTES
1. Juliet Javellana, Estrada sees no need for truth commission (September 28, 1999), Philippine Daily Inquirer, available at http://www.inquirer.net.
http://www.inquirer.net.
3. Donna S. Cueto and Michael Lim Ubac, Estrada withdrawal of 43M alarms gov’t (January 23, 2001), Philippine Daily Inquirer, available at http://www.inquirer.net.
4. Malou Guanzon-Apalisok, Erap enemies press for ‘truth commission’ (February 8, 2001), Philippine Daily Inquirer, available at http://www.inquirer.net.
5. Editorial, Truth and justice (February 5, 2001), Philippine Daily Inquirer available at http://www.inquirer.net.
6. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litig.), 25 F.3d 1467, 1469 (9th Cir. Haw. 1994).
7. Sol Schreiber & Laura D. Weissbach, In Re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation: A Personal Account of the Role of the Special Master, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 475, 479 (1998).
8. Dr. Alfred W. McCoy, Human rights under the Marcos Regime (October 3, 1999), Philippine Daily Inquirer, available at http://www.inquirer.net. .
9. Rosario M. Cortes, State Violence - A Historical Perspective: The Philippine Experience, in State Violence 7, 18 (Ponciano L. Benaggen, ed. 1987).
10. Carolyn O. Arguillas, Rights abuses still plagued RP (December 9, 1999), Philippine Daily Inquirer, available at http://www.inquirer.net.
11. Paul van Zyl, Dilemmas of Transitional Justice: The Case of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 52 Journal of International Affairs 647, 664 (1999).
12. McCoy, see supra note 8.
13. Carolina G. Hernandez, The Anatomy of State Violence: The Philippine Experience, in State Violence 6 (Ponciano L. Benaggen, ed. 1987).
14. Timothy Phillips and Mary Albon, When Prosecution Is Not Possible: Alternative Means of Seeking Accountability for War Crimes, in War Crimes: the Legacy of Nuremberg 244, 250 (Belinda Cooper ed. 1999).
15. Ibid..
16. Michael P. Scharf, The Case for a Permanent International Truth Commission, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 375, 378 (1997).
17. Id at 380.
18. Executive Order No. 8, March 18, 1986 as quoted in Belinda A. Aquino, The Human Rights Debacle in the Philippines, in Impunity and Human Rights in International Law and Practice 231, 232 (Noami Roht-Arriaza ed. 1995).
19. Ibid.
20. Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions - 1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study, 16 Human Rights Quarterly 597, 620 (1994).
21. Aquino, see supra note 18, at 232.
22. Hayner, see supra note 20.
23. Aquino, see supra note 18, at 236.
24. Hayner, see supra note 20.
25. Aquino, see supra note 18, at 237.
26. Leonora C. Angeles, The Quest for Justice: Obstacles to the Redress of Human Rights Violations in the Philippines 19 (1994).
27. Id. at 34-35.
28. Id at 124.
29. United States Institute for Peace website on Truth Commissions, available at http://www.usip.org/library/truth.html#Phillipines.
30. Angeles, see supra note 26, at 36.
31. Hayner, see supra note 20, at 620.
32. See Ma. Glenda R. Ramirez, Twice Victimized: The Marcos Human Rights Litigation Revisited, Human Rights FORUM (July 2001 issue, PhilRights) for a comprehensive discussion on this subject.
33. Clemente v. Marcos, No. 87-1707 (9th Cir. July 10, 1989); Ortigas v. Marcos, No. 87-1706 (9th Cir. July 10, 1989); Sison v. Marcos, No. 86-2496 (9th Cir. July 10, 1989); Hilao v. Marcos, No. 86-2449 (9th Cir. July 10, 1989); Trajano v. Marcos, No. 86-2448 (9th Cir. July 10, 1989).
34. Ralph G. Steinhardt, Fulfilling the Promise of Filartiga: Litigating Human Rights Claims Against the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 20 YALE J. INT’L. L. 65, 66 n.1 (1995).
35. See Hilao, 25 F.3d at 1469 at 1469.
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
37. Steinhardt, supra note 34, at 67.
38. See Hilao, 25 F.3d at 1469.
39. In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1470 (D. Haw. 1995).
40. See Hilao, 25 F.3d at 1469.
41. In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1460, 1464 (D. Haw. 1995).
42. Ellen Lutz, The Marcos Human Rights Litigation: Can Justice Be Achieved in U.S. Courts For Abuses That Occurred Abroad, 14 B.C. Third World L.J. 43, 48 (1994).
43. Ibid at 49
44. See In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig. at 1464.
45. City News Service, Marcos (September 11, 2000), available at LEXIS, City News Service File.
46. Scharf see supra note 16, at 388.
47. Lutz, see supra note 42, at 49.
48. Scharf, see supra note 16, at 390 and 391.
49. Id. at 391
50. John Dugard, Retrospective Justice: International Law and the South African Model, in Law and the South African Model in n.38 citing Oppenheim’s International Law (Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts, eds. 1992).
51. See Republic v. Marcos, 806 F.2d at 348.
52. Andrea T. Echavez & Martin P. Marfil, Sandigan asked to modify ruling (September
21, 2000), Philippine Daily Inquirer, available at http://www.inquirer.net.
53. Sandiganbayan is a special court with jurisdiction over graft and corrupt practices committed by government officials.
54. Donna S. Cueto & Volt Contreras, Gov’t, Marcoses working on new compromise deal (February 16, 2000), Philippine Daily Inquirer, available at http://www.inquirer.net.
55. Blanche S. Rivera & Michael Lim Ubac, Sandigan ruling revives rights victims’ grudge (September 22, 2000), Philippine Daily Inquirer, available at http://www.inquirer.net.
56. Stella O. Gonzales & Donna Pazzibugan, Sandigan decision applauded, lambasted (July 28, 1999), Philippine Daily Inquirer, available at http://www.inquirer.net.
57. Radha Basu, Rights Victims Live with Marcos Legacy (May 21, 1999), available at http://www.ips.org.
58. Anita Ramasastry, Secrets and Lies? Swiss Banks And International Human Rights, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 325, 450 (1998).
59. In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 94 F.3d 539, 543 (9th Cir. 1996).
60. Rocky Nazareno, Sandigan rejects anew $150-M Marcos deal (March 1, 2000), available at http://www.inquirer.net. .
61. Basu, supra note at 57.
62. Johanna Son, Despite Legal Win, No Accountability from Marcoses (March 1, 1999), available at http://www.ips.org..
63. The judge also ordered the victims to "forever refrain" from "initiating, maintaining or proceeding on any claim for violation of human rights" committed between 1972 and 1986 against the Philippine government and the Marcos estate, see Christine Herrera, U.S. judge approves Marcos settlement (May 1, 1999), Philippine Daily Inquirer, available at http://www.inquirer.net.