The number of different things that non-Western modernity has produced in terms of actual practices in localized situations never really managed to find a larger language which could give them the identity or the character of a different modernity. That is what I meant when I said that we also became the victims of modernity. The overall constraints of a given framework have always bound us to merely innovating at a localized level but without ever succeeding in claiming that this is in fact a more general framework of modernity which can be universally used by others.

So, in terms of intellectual claims, we still remain victims of Western modernity, despite the fact that places like China might well become the real powerhouses of modernity in the 21st century. China is in fact the perfect example: in spite of all this amazing transformation, intellectually there are almost no claims that emerge from there that suggest that they are changing faster than any other part of the world. The language in which this change is being described is the old language of modernization, growth, technology and so on. It is exactly the same language. That is why, even for places like China, in this respect, they still remain victims of modernity.

Here in the West, as I am sure you're aware, it is often thought that postcolonial studies represent a tendency in the Third World to disavow responsibility for the problems that are endemic to that world. Why, it is argued, do they keep on talking about colonialism when colonialism ended half a century ago? How do you respond to such allegations?

It is not to disavow responsibility at all, it is actually to claim a certain responsibility which has been denied. In a sense, what is often seen as the inability of postcolonial states to resolve many of these new problems of modernity is not because the people have not often managed to find innovative solutions; the problem lies with the larger formation of ideas invented in the West. I think that is where the colonial legacy is so strong. That China can grow at such a pace, and grow in forms that can only be described as 'modern', and yet have no larger frame of political discourse within which this experience can be described as anything other than simply a replication, indeed a poor replication, of what had happened in the West, I think, summarizes the problem. That is clearly a mis-description of what is happening in China; yet, there is no other language to describe it. That, I think, is the colonial legacy. The only way one can assume authority over what one is doing, the only way one could claim responsibility for what one is doing, would be, in a sense, to finally get rid of that colonial legacy.

This is to declare that Western modernity is, in fact, an incomplete and probably imperfect modernity; there are better ways of doing things. Those better ways can emerge in other parts of the world that are becoming modern. That is the claim that needs to be made. As I keep saying, there are numerous examples of actual localized practices where this kind of innovative thinking and innovative functioning has actually taken place. It is a question of finding a larger discursive frame, which is different and new and innovative. That is where I think the colonial legacy is the constraint; it actually has not allowed for that larger representation to be made.

My answer is that perhaps postcolonial studies has not actually managed to provide that discursive frame. It is not that it tried to disavow responsibility or said that all the travails of the postcolonial world are because of what colonialism did to those places. That is not true at all. The origin of Subaltern Studies, as a specific postcolonial project, was in fact to understand the failures of the Indian nationalist elite. No argument was ever made that, for instance, what Indira Gandhi did was because of British colonialism. Not at all. The problem is actually very often misrepresented by those who feel uncomfortable with the findings of postcolonial studies. They say: "Let bygones be bygones; forget about colonialism because that's history - let's get on with the present." Well, people in the postcolonial world are all trying to get on with their present. What is happening is that people all over the world are desperately trying to forget the legacies of colonialism and trying to get ahead with the project in hand. Effectively, in terms of actual practices, that is what people have been trying to do, successfully or unsuccessfully. The real constraint, however, has been of trying to develop a larger or universal language within which those efforts can be understood and described. The weight of the claim that Western modernity is a complete and finished project keeps imposing these enormous shackles on other attempts elsewhere in the world.

You conclude the article "Beyond the Nation? Or Within?" by suggesting that the framework of global modernity will "inevitably structure the world according to a pattern that is profoundly colonial". What did you mean by this?

Again, I think I probably meant more or less the same thing as I said before. By the framework of global modernity, I meant this overall discursive frame which claims to be universal and complete. But it is not actually universal, nor is it complete. All of the things that have been described as globalization in the last decade or so are good examples of this. Globalization is often claimed as a new thing that has emerged. Yet a lot of what has happened with globalization has happened for the last 100-150 years.

This is the weight of a language which can claim a certain universality, an applicability to almost everything that happens anywhere in the world. That is really the discursive power of Western modernity, which can encompass and bring under its wings almost anything that happens anywhere in the world. So that a lot of the local innovations simply never get recognized for the specific differences that they represent; the differences are simply erased. The only place where the differences get recognized is when they are seen or argued to be inconsistent with the larger pattern. That is the profoundly colonial pattern of the structure of theoretical discourse; what is recognized as different is necessarily excluded, whereas everything else that can be made consistent is not recognized as different. If you go back to what I said earlier on about the rule of colonial difference, it is exactly that.