Chung Oknim, professor of International Relations and UN Studies at Sunmoon University in South Korea, Katy Oh, co-author of North Korea through the Looking Glass, and Michael Kulma, Director of Policy Programs at Asia Society, comment on the deal reached in Beijing where the six-party talks concluded with North Korea agreeing to take the first steps towards nuclear disarmament.

According to the agreement, North Korea has made a commitment to close down its Yongbyon reactor within 60 days, in return for 50,000 metric tons of fuel aid or economic aid of equal value. Under the deal, North Korea will eventually receive another one million tonnes of fuel oil or an equivalent when it permanently disables its nuclear operations.

Equally importantly, the US has agreed to begin the process of removing North Korea from its list of terror states and establish diplomatic relations, while Japan will also discuss normalizing relations with the North.

Chung Oknim

Is this a good deal?

Yes, I think it's a good starting point. But it's just a starting point so we have a long way to go until North Korea finally dismantles its nuclear weapons program.

It's a step by step, tit for tat process. If North Korea disables the nuclear reactor in Yongbyon then they will get the fuel or other aid. So if they shut down the facility, they get the first carrot from the US, China, South Korea and Russia. The added incentive allows for another 1 million tons of oil or the equivalent from the other parties, but that's a long way off.

Is it realistic?

So far we don't have any better options so it's realistically the best possible option, but still we have some serious questions to make sure North Korea abandons its nuclear program. The agreement did not mention how to make them give up plutonium or their atomic bombs. But even if this was not addressed in any detail, they agreed, the working group, to deal with this moving forward. So this will be dealt with by the working group next time. In all these senses, this is just a starting point. Until North Korea gives up the plutonium, atomic bombs and uranium enrichment programs which they have strongly denied having, then this agreement will not be successful at all.

They have sidestepped previous agreements--

In some sense there is little difference between the 1994 Geneva agreement and this agreement. Then, North Korea agreed to freeze nuclear research; this time the terminology is to shut down or disable. That's the difference. Unless the other five parties finally reach some agreement on how to make North Korea dismantle or finally just give up its plutonium or atomic bombs, then there will not be much difference from 1994. I believe there is possibly better hope now, but North Korea will not easily give up its plutonium and nuclear materials programs. And again, North Korea has strongly denied the uranium enrichment program others strongly suspect. So there's a long way to go.

What should we be looking for next?

On March 19 another round of talks will be held, and working groups will be formed and initiated. That is when they must deal with other issues of plutonium, uranium enrichment, and the dismantling of all nuclear programs in the north. But then North Korea will also demand more carrots. The aid and other incentives do matter. But whether North Korea will finally give up its nuclear weapons...we have to wait and see.

Interview conducted by Deanna Lee

Katy Oh

Could you give us your general comments on the agreement that was reached at the six party talks in Beijing?

Here is my position: out of limited options, this is not a bad deal although it looks like a repetition of the Geneva Agreed Framework in 1994. The reason I say this is an acceptable agreement is that nothing actually concrete was decided right away and I think this has basically created a 60-day honeymoon for the implementation process. Also we did not promise that we will deliver large amounts of heavy fuel oil right away; only 50,000 tonnes, so in that sense I think we have space and time to work with this agreement.

Do you think that the US made more concessions to reach the present agreement than other parties involved?

Well at least it looks like we are repeating the Agreed Framework of 1994 because basically after six years of the status quo -- or maybe even a declining situation -- we went back to talk with them bilaterally and asked them to come back and then we showed some concessions. It certainly looks like the US lost some face. But again there were limited options, not much you can do, and at least you try to broach this difficult issue again and then maybe get back to the table and start the process again. So in that sense I shouldn't just blame the US, I think it is time to talk to the North Koreans.

To what extent do you think North Korea tested when they did last year because the US had refused to engage in bilateral talks?

My position on the nuclear tests was that sooner or later they had to do it because they announced about five or six times that they are a nuclear power and nobody trusted them, or believed them, or thought of them as a true nuclear power. So, in that sense, testing is the only way to tell the world that they are a nuclear power. I think sooner or later they would have tested, and not because the US rejected bilateral talks. It could give them some more time, but sooner or later they had to do it. This was just their path towards nuclearization.

So what do you think the prospects are for this agreement in the immediate future?

If you read all the detail that came out, it gives you a sense that we didn't jump in to signing right away all the important issues. Mainly this agreement showed an agenda that we have to work on and the process to go through. A lot of people have already told me that the US and South Korea maybe are the losers because they've shown these concessions, and will deliver the oil again, even though North Korea did not really denounce the highly enriched uranium program whatsoever.

In my mind, North Korea is on the testing table. If North Korea again this time becomes wishy-washy, and again becomes a tough demander, adding more conditions, and backing away from this agreement, I think it gives the US new information; maybe North Korea is not really interested in giving up nuclear weapons. Secondly, North Korea is not interested in genuine negotiation. Finally, maybe the US can say, "We did our best, but we cannot deal with it anymore." So in a sense, the realistic test is now given to North Korea. In that sense we should not be that worried about the implementation.

In an article you wrote for the Asia Society when North Korea tested last year, you even recommended "non-violent regime change" in North Korea. Would you still advocate that position?

I think ultimately under a dictatorial leadership that doesn't have any accountability, any transparency, in total secrecy, starving its people and not opening the society for economic reform, I think the current regime is not good news for any resolution of a fundamental post-nuclear and non-nuclear issue. In that sense, I still stick to my principle.

The situation in North Korea, as it's been described in the press, is becoming worse and worse given the humanitarian disaster unfolding, both in terms of food shortages of course but also the energy crisis. How, if at all, will this agreement affect any of this in the immediate term?

I think this agreement is good news. Maybe that is one of the very important background factors: the dire economic situation and food shortage may be the driving factor for North Korea to come to the table to negotiate and to get the aid. They need a minimum of 4.3 million tonnes of grain; this year they have only 2.8 million, and basically, without the additional 1.5 million tonnes of rice and grain, people will starve to death. That is the main factor why North Korea showed some flexibility and came to the table. So it's good news for them because they get the food, they get the aid, and they have breathing space to think about serious implementation during the next few months.

How do you think North Korea's neighbors will respond? South Korea, Japan, China…?

Every country's position is already very clear through this process. Japan's position is stick to the principle without talking about the resolution of abductees' issue. Japan will not pitch in through aid, neither with food nor energy. They have made this very clear. But in principle they will be going along together with the US and South Korea to be a part of the process. And if there is improvement, they will do something.

Russia may be a free rider because they may sometimes reduce some debt that North Korea owes to them but I don't think that Russia is ready to give a chunk of energy and gas to North Korea.

China is coming out to be the winner, the double winner. Their diplomatic stature is heightened, and they may be less burdened in practical terms.

South Korea is a very burdened party but as South Korea argues that North Korea is our divided half of the peninsula, I think South Korean government is willing to help.

The US is principally the head of the negotiations, but I think the real chunk of aid will come from South Korea.

Interview conducted by Nermeen Shaikh

The North Korean Deal: One-Step Forward
Michael Kulma

In the wee hours of the American morning a deal was struck in the six-party talks and North Korea agreed to shut down its main nuclear reactor, allow international inspectors into the country and eventually dismantle its nuclear weapons program. In exchange, the United States, China, South Korea and Russia are to provide a package of food, fuel, and other aid. In addition, both the United States and Japan agreed to discuss normalizing relations with North Korea.

As this marks the first concrete plan for moving forward in years, Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, the lead U.S. negotiator, and his counterparts, are to be applauded for their efforts in making this come to pass in light of past obstacles put in place by both the North Koreans and our own administration.

But let us not be too hasty in calling this a “success.” Too many times have we seen promises of peace fall through the cracks of history. Today we must be realistic as we view this agreement in both historical terms and as regards the specific steps for moving forward.

Hopes were also high for the 1994 Agreed Framework, aimed at an overall resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea agreed to shut down its graphite-moderated reactors, stay a member of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), welcome back inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency, and work toward the normalization of relations with the United States. In exchange, the United States would help provide two light-water nuclear reactors, provide heavy fuel oil, and work toward the normalization of relations with the United States.

So what lay behind the failure of that initiative? Both sides can share the blame. In October 2002, then-Assistant Secretary of State, James Kelly, accused the North Koreans of having in place a highly-enriched uranium project, a direct affront to the 1994 agreement. In addition, while fuel oil shipments were delivered, the construction of the light-water reactors was years behind schedule and the normalization of relations was far from reality. This confluence of factors put a virtual end to the Agreement.

Since that time, there have been five rounds of Six Party (United States, Japan, South Korea, China, Russia, and North Korea) talks, aimed at finding a peaceful solution to security issues on the Peninsula. While certainly useful in and of themselves, until today, there has been little fruit borne in these negotiations.

Most promising were the meetings in September 2005, at the end of which was issued a Joint Declaration. This document spoke of a verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula where North Korea would abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs while returning to the NPT and IAEA safeguards. At the same time, the United States affirmed that it had no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and that it had no intent to attack or invade North Korea. The six parties also undertook to promote greater economic cooperation and to negotiate a permanent peace regime, in a phased manner. Spirits were high following the announcement of this agreement, seen as a major breakthrough in negotiations and further talks were scheduled for November of that year.

Unfortunately, disagreement over implementation and the US imposition of financial restrictions against banks and North Korean companies for alleged involvement in counterfeiting and other activities led to a stalled process. Since that time, North Korea has linked the nuclear and financial issues, while the United States has seen them as separate. The result: no concrete progress on the Joint Declaration.

Relations eroded further in July 2006, when North Korea test-fired six missiles, including a long-range missile, which the U.S. deemed a provocative action. Even more concerning, however, was the North Korean declaration later that year of a successful underground nuclear test. This led to UN sanctions against North Korea as punishment.

Even with these reminders of previous hopes dashed, the current agreement faces many other hurdles, any one of which could prove to upend or stall further progress. For starters: will North Korea meet the 60-day deadline to accomplish the first steps toward disarmament? Will the first part and subsequent aid be delivered? Can real progress be made on the normalization of relations?

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is the larger overarching question as to whether the two main players in this process, the United States and North Korea, are serious about peace. If the history of recent relations teaches us any lessons, it is that we must approach this agreement with guarded optimism.

Today, the six parties have taken one step forward. For the sake of peace and security in Northeast Asia, let us hope that we don’t end up two steps back.

Also see Asia Society analysts on North Korean crisis (October 2006).