Ralph Hassig & Katy Oh
Co-authors, North Korea through the Looking Glass (Brookings, 2000) and Asia Society analysts

It was a small test, wasn't it? A piddling yield of a kiloton or less. Not like India's 5 kiloton blast in 1974 (they claimed 12 to 15), or Pakistan's multiple tests in 1998, the largest of which was about 10 kilotons. For the United States, Trinity, in 1945, was 20 kilotons, and that was just the first of over a thousand tests to come. In the 1950s and the early 1960s, when men were men and bombs were bombs, the skies over Nevada, Bikini, and Eniwetok lit up with giant mushroom clouds from nuclear and thermonuclear explosions ranging from a few kilotons to 15,000 kilotons. And they had interesting names too, with series like Buster-Jangle, Teapot, Wigwam, Nougat, and Castle, and individual tests called Shrimp (the largest), Alarm Clock, Jughead, Zombie, and Morgenstern. It was almost like a game.

Since the Limited Test Ban treaty of 1963, the tests have mostly gone underground, where they are less interesting to the general public, who first hear about them, if at all, in terms of their seismic signature. North Korea's signature was so small that, a couple of days later, the Japanese mistook a small earthquake for another North Korean test. No one watching the spectacular atmospheric tests of the 1950s ever mistook them for anything else. Some of the more informed North Koreans have probably seen photos or films of some of those tests, and may rue the change in times that restricts them to such obscure testing.

To the extent that North Korea's nuclear program is newsworthy, it was news in the late 1980s, when a large plutonium reprocessing plant was discovered by satellite imagery, or in the early 1990s, when intelligence analysts began to release estimates that the North Koreans had reprocessed sufficient plutonium to make one or two bombs. Since then, the goal of the North Koreans has been clear, despite their repeated protests that they had no intention to develop nuclear weapons or, later, that they were being forced to develop these weapons to counter American hostility. North Korea has followed in the footsteps of the other nuclear weapons states by manufacturing an arsenal of nuclear weapons, and now, as a matter of course, the arsenal is being tested.

The fact that the world is so alarmed by this test is an indication that people have not been paying attention, or have been trying to avert their eyes from what they didn't want to see. To be shocked or angered by North Korea's nuclear test makes no more sense than having a fit when your son, who last year purchased his first gun with your full knowledge, finally goes out into the woods to fire a few practice rounds.

The international community is momentarily focusing its attention on the Korean peninsula, and casting about for a decisive response that will not only stop Pyongyang's nuclear program in its tracks but reverse the momentum built up over the last twenty years. With this attention coming so late in the day, the danger is that a hastily implemented punitive response will worsen the situation, as punitive responses generally do. Long-term problems usually require long-term solutions.

We suggest that the best solution is to initiate, even at this late date, a serious campaign of non-violent "regime behavior change" (which in practice means regime change) by communicating directly with the North Korean people through radio and other means. Such communication will provide them with knowledge about their regime and the outside world that will enable them to make their own decisions about how they want to live, who should govern them, and what kind of weapons they need.

China and South Korea might be able to hasten the end of the Kim regime by cutting off aid and trade with North Korea, but this course of action would impose severe hardship on millions of North Koreans, long before their regime has fallen. Twenty million North Koreans don't have the same kind of power that Kim exercises with his police and army, but collectively they do hold enormous power-the same kind of power that people throughout the communist bloc successfully exercised in the late 1980s.

Meredith Jung-En Woo
The Korea Foundation Professor of Political Science and Korean Studies and Director of the Korean Studies Program, University of Michigan and Asia Society analyst

On October 9, the DPRK has declared that it had successfully tested a nuclear weapon. Although it is unclear whether the explosion was indeed caused by a nuclear weapon, the North Korean action is likely to bring the issue of further sanctions on the DPRK. The United States has maintained the most comprehensive sanctions on the DPRK of any UN country since 1950, right up to 2000 when it was eased somewhat in response to North Korea’s self-imposed missile test moratorium. Since 2005 US measures against North Korea have tightened, mostly targeting third parties engaged in financial transactions with North Korea. Japan has also implemented a series of sanctions against North Korea starting in 1998, and which has gotten stringent, involving tightening of export controls, customs regulations, citizen boycotts of North Korean goods, and various shipping regulations. Japan has also complied with the American initiative to choke financial flows in and out of North Korea.

What further sanctions can be imposed on North Korea and with what consequences? The most draconian sanctions would involve food, energy, and fertilizers, now supplied by China and South Korea. The denial of food and energy to North Korea may very well bring the country to the brink of famine once again. But it is unlikely to cause the collapse of the regime. The regime will simply pass on the cost to the people. Amid economic collapse and ensuing famine in the late 1990s, the North Korean regime showed that it could not only survive the crisis but tighten its authoritarian grip on the populace. For these reasons I think China and South Korea are unlikely to push for the complete strangulation of the North Korean economy for any length of time. Nor is South Korea likely to reverse its long standing policy of economic engagement as the best solution to deal with North Korea, and scrap its investments in North Korea’s special economic zone.

Politically the prospect of a nuclear North Korea raises the issue of the arms race in Northeast Asia. It will accelerate and deepen US/Japan cooperation on joint ballistic missiles and a next generation ship-born missile defense system, and makes the prospect of nuclear Japan (with enough plutonium stockpile to make 900 nuclear warheads) a possibility to be debated. In the long run, this will exacerbate the tension in Northeast Asia, seemingly pitting US and Japan (and quite possibly Taiwan) on one side, and China and South Koreas on the other.

Jamie Metzl
Executive Vice President, Asia Society

October 11 from Seoul

What are the responses that are emerging from across the region?

Condemning North Korea is the easy part. The tough thing will be to figure out what comes next. It seems very likely that the US and Japan will push for a tough sanctions regime, to punish North Korea and to limit its ability to both further develop its nuclear arms capability and to proliferate nuclear weapons to other states and non-state actors.

China and South Korea on the other hand may well seek to balance censuring North Korea to deliver a message and limit its ability to proliferate on the one hand, and causing North Korea so much pain that it destabilizes the North Korean regime and risks collapse on the other.

So in the coming weeks we may well see a growing divide between those who want tougher sanctions on North Korea and those who want to deliver a message but not destabilize the regime.

In the meetings you've been having in Seoul, what is your sense of the inside reaction to this?

From a South Korean perspective in some ways the difference between knowing North Korea had nuclear capabilities and North Korea testing is not enormous. But from the perspective of those who are thinking regionally, this is an earth-shattering event in more ways than one.

Are prominent South Koreans more concerned in private than the rest of us are hearing?

People are concerned but they're concerned both about North Korea having nuclear weapons and they are concerned about what the implications of that will be for Japan, China and the rest of the region.

How do they feel about the UN reaction so far?

I think there is agreement across the board that the North Korean action is reprehensible, and there's unanimous agreement on the level of condemnation. The tough issues that lie ahead however have to do with how far the international community and South Korea should go. What does this mean for the 'Sunshine Policy' of South Korea? What does this mean for the Kaesong Industrial Zone? My sense is that the South Koreans are only beginning to come to terms with the choice they may need to make between pursuing policies that engage North Korea, and remaining aligned in a united front with the US and Japan surrounding a tough sanctions regime.

What does this mean for the six party talks?

My guess is that the North Koreans will shortly announce their willingness to return to the six party talks now that they feel that they would be bargaining from a position of strength. And there may well be a significant divide between those who want to impose tough sanctions on North Korea, and those who want to impose symbolic sanctions but nothing that would be so tough that it might jeopardize the six party talks.

Will all parties want to go back to the six party talks?

That's certainly unclear. And there will be questions of what conditions will be required for a return to those negotiations and that is likely to be a sticking point among the parties.

Robert Immerman
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University, and Asia Society analyst

The Effect on Japan of the North Korean Nuclear Test
In the short run, the North Korean nuclear test will almost certainly harden and broaden anti-DPRK sentiment among the Japanese public and across virtually the entire political spectrum. These sentiments, in turn, will spur the new Abe administration to adapt tougher unilateral sanctions against the DPRK as well as to strongly support Chapter 7 sanctions in the UN Security Council.

The nuclear test is also likely to speed up action in the Japanese Diet on long pending legislation to elevate the status of Japan's defense forces and to substantially increase military spending on missile defense programs.

Because of its timing - just as a new Japanese Prime Minister was attempting to repair relations with the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Korea - the North Korean nuclear explosion may also test the degree to which Mr. Abe's visits to Beijing and Seoul have succeeded in shifting the attention of PRC and the ROK from differences over interpretations of history to the need for joint action with Japan to manage future security threats in North Asia.

In the next few weeks, Japan's skills in multilateral diplomacy will be very much on display since Japan chairs the UN Security Council for the month of October, the Japanese Permanent Representative, in his capacity as President of the Council, can exert considerable influence on the contents of the resolution imposing sanctions on North Korea. Will he be able to play a major role in forging a consensus resolution that can win the support of all five permanent members of the Council? The outcome of these deliberations may well strengthen support among UN member states for Japan's flagging bid for permanent membership on the Security Council.

The events of the past few days will not - repeat not - push Japan towards development of its own nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Abe has already ruled out this possibility in a statement earlier this week in the Diet. In spite of the occasional provocative remark by a local politician, weekly magazine or retired diplomat, Japanese public sentiment remains overwhelmingly opposed to a nuclear armed Japan. Japan favors the use of sticks as well as carrots in trying to change North Korean behavior but it does not want those sticks dipped in uranium.

Orville Schell
Dean of Journalism School, University of California, Berkeley, and Director, Center on US-China Relations, Asia Society

Implications for US-China relationship
In the short run, it actually means a closer relationship, because I think China got pushed a little closer now to recognizing that it would be more than a potential hazard, but perhaps an actual hazard to have a nuclear power next door.

But of course now there are questions as to whether they had a nuclear blast at all, so we'll have to wait and see how that washes out.

China influence over North Korea
For some time in the six party talks, the Bush administration has been pushing China since in the view of Washington China is the only power with any real leverage. They do have a fuel pipeline to North Korea. But in actuality I think the Russians may end up having as much influence as the Chinese do and of course we seem to have less leverage these days with the Russians. This is an odd case where there are very few people who have much leverage at all.

Should China begin to emerge more as a truly problem-solving, constructive member of the international community, I think it will be around the Korea question. For that reason, if none other, it's worth watching carefully.

If China does not step up in this way, it will either mean that they really don't have as much influence as we sometimes imagine or they're running into their old fear that if they interfere in anther country's internal affairs, then they would set a precedent for a country such as the US to interfere in their affairs. They have a very strict constructionist view on sovereignty which says that nobody has the right to tell anybody what to do in terms of domestic affairs.

This is a major reason why China is so reluctant to throw its weight around internationally. They don't want themselves to fall prey to the presumption that we're all our brother's keeper.

Possible US responses
There are limited things we can do to North Korea. One, we could search ships. The Chinese will balk at that. They certainly will not subscribe to stopping ships in the high seas. We did that to a Chinese ship a number of years ago and there was nothing on it. This is a patent violation of sovereignty.

Even though they're coming to closer to us by calling this act "brazen", there are limits to what China is going to be willing to apply pressure and seem to interfere in North Korea's internal affairs.

The question of how Japan's relationship to China plays out is also very important. China really does want good relations with the US but they want it on terms which are their own, and that means they do not want to establish any precedents or leave the door open at all for the US to start bossing them around and telling them what to do.

North Korea reminds one in certain ways of China during the Cultural Revolution. We have China as an example of a country that did evolve rather spectacularly at least economically speaking out of that era. It's only to say that it could happen to North Korea. But as of yet the first green shoots of reformist spring time are rather meager.

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