a. Japan. No members of the business community, academia, and the media consider ties to be "too close." Indeed, among the latter two, the number who think ties are "too weak" is a bit above the norm. The more positive academic view mirrors the levels of trust, just noted.

b. China. None of the respondents believes ties with China are "too close." Rather, there is a virtual split between "about right" (especially among the military) and "too weak" (with government and public officials, women, and the younger age cohort a bit more inclined than the norm to favor closer links). The implicit majority desire for closer links reappears below.

c. Russia. On balance, the status of current links with Russia is viewed in a fashion very similar to those with China. Representatives of the media and, especially, government and political figures, favor closer ties.

2. Assessments of Level of Future Ties with Japan, China, Russia, and the United States
"How do you think ties between the ROK and [country] will be in the future?"

a.United States. Compared with the other guesstimates about the direction of future ties, there appears to be a strong majority sense that relations with the U.S. may have reached a plateau, and will remain unchanged. Since they are already so close (too close for some, as we shall see shortly), this is not automatically a worrisome finding.

What would have been disconcerting would be substantial expectations of weakened ties. But, as was the case vis-a-vis the other countries in our test, few respondents expect ties with the U.S. to deteriorate in the years ahead: only NGO members and, to a lesser extent, women exceeded the low norm that held this view. Among media representatives, a proportion above the norm expected closer future ties. Politicians, business people, and the military were unanimous in seeing no change ahead.

b. Japan. This can be seen as another cautious finding, but with a significant proportion anticipating close ties ahead. Media representatives are the most positive on this score.

c. China. Our respondents clearly look to future ties with China with considerable optimism. None foresee a weakening of bilateral ties, and a very substantial majority looks to closer relations - with government and public figures, along with women, unanimous on this count. Military respondents were evenly split between "closer" and "unchanged."

This set of responses, combined with estimates of comparative importance of future relations, which we turn to below, represents one of the most significant aspects of this survey project. For many Koreans, China represents a policy choice that does not apply to either Japan or Russia.

d. Russia. As with Japan, this virtual split between "closer" and "unchanged" probably reflects both caution and uncertainty. Government and public officials and, to a lesser degree, members of the media and press were more inclined than the norm to think that current ties are "too weak."

3. Assessments of Importance of Future Ties
"Looking ahead 10 years or so, which do you think will be more important? Korea's ties with [country] or Korea's ties with the U.S.?"

a. U.S. vis-a-vis China. In one of the most significant findings in this survey, majorities of almost all survey categories ranked future ties with China as more important than those the United States, with highest numbers among NGO representatives and women. Two groups stood out as putting the U.S. first: members of academia, many of whom have exceptionally close ties with their counterparts in the United States; and the military, with unique bonds with American colleagues.

Reasons give by those who gave China preeminence over the United States frequently parallel those given for Japan, as we will note below:

• geographic propinquity
• China's rising economic strength; potential superpower
• China potentially a larger market
• stronger cultural links
• development of a Northeast Asia Bloc
• China potentially easier to deal with than the United States; possible bargaining chip
• greater potential to play a role in China's development
• potential long-term decline of U.S. influence in Far East, matched by rise of China

Implicit in some of these comments is a sense that, for many Koreans, China is increasingly a country with which Korea feels comfortable. Travel to China is now possible, and visitors often feel a sense of kinship. China is also a country that can, and does, say "no" to the United States. That ability, and strength, can appeal to the widespread sense of annoyance in dealings with the U.S., already noted. Frustration with U.S. policy toward North Korea, for example, seen by many South Koreans as heightening South-North tensions, can also play into China's hand.

For those who looked to the U.S. as the key partner, there were also parallels with Japan:

• existence of Pax Americana
• importance of ROK-U.S. military alliance
• overriding national interest to maintain close ties with U.S.
• U.S. has been, and will continue to be, closest ally
• China a potentially threatening neighbor
• China has uncertain future; inherent unstableness of national system

These are powerful reasons for endorsing a continuing, close relationship between the Republic of Korea and the United States. While the growing fascination with China should not be underestimated, neither should it be too quickly interpreted as indicating some kind of basic new future realignment. Indeed, links between Korea and China, on one hand, and Korea and the U.S., on the other, do not have to be seen as some kind of zero-sum game. Stability in Northeast Asia would be enhanced, not weakened, by solid ties both ways.

While ties between China and the Republic of Korea have changed dramatically, a long march lies ahead before that relationship will challenge, never mind truly jeopardize, links now in place between Korea and the United States. For the foreseeable future, Korea may have the luxury of not having to choose between China and the U.S., all the more so if China continues to be seen by Washington policy makers as playing a constructive and supportive role in the "war of terrorism."

b. U.S. vis-a-vis Japan. By a three-to-one margin, respondents believe that future ties with the United States will be more important to Korea than those with Japan. That was the unanimous view of the military, a view also held well above the norm by government and public officials, and the older age cohort. NGO officials and women were the only groups that put Korea's future ties with Japan ahead of those with the United States.

Those who stressed ties with Japan cited a number of factors:

• geography (mentioned frequently)
• development of a Northeast Asian and/or Asian bloc (also mentioned frequently)
• growing emergence of China (again, frequently)
• cultural links

Primary importance given to ties with the United States rested on a differing set of perceptions:

• U.S. will continue to be the sole superpower
• Pax Americana; U.S. the leader of international order
• Strong ties with U.S. helpful for national security, confronted with strong neighboring countries (e.g., China)
• history limits Japan's future role
• U.S. has been a blood ally

c. U.S. vis-a-vis Russia. Given the small proportion (mostly NGO figures) who chose Russia over the U.S., the Russia-first factors were minimal:

• geography
• overall economic developments in Asia
• potential for cooperation with Russia, China, and Japan

Reasons for giving Russia second billing were plentiful:

• Russia's domestic economic and political difficulties
• U.S. has been a traditionally friendly nation
• Pax Americana
• Russia and Korea are not complementary to each other
• Russia lacks economic potential
• Russia's influence will be on the decrease
• U.S. is closest ally, and sole superpower
• "U.S. is our old friend and democratic country"

4. Korea and Japan: Some Specifics

The feeling among some that Japan's past behavior in and toward Korea continues to cause present anxieties was apparent in responses to two questions in our survey.

a. Past behavior. Every professional group in our study registered overwhelming majority support for the proposition that Japan has "not expressed adequate remorse for its past behavior" toward Korea, and "needs to do more." More than nine respondents in 10 were of this view, and unanimously so among politicians, government and public officials, academia, NGOs, and the military. One slight exception was among the media, where one in four thought Japan had done enough.

b. Potential future military threat. Worries about the possibility that Japan might become a major military power or military threat in Asia ran high with our respondents. Three in four said they were either "very worried" or "somewhat worried." The remaining one-quarter said only that they were "not too worried." None said they were "not at all worried." Most concerned were members of the media; all were at least "somewhat worried" about a Japanese military resurgence. Least concerned, on the other hand, were members of academia, with a clear majority in the "not too worried" column. This is in line with more positive views registered this group noted earlier.

Such negatives in views about Japan continue to be driven by the content of Korean textbooks, and reporting in the Korean mass media. The recent heated controversy in both Korea and China, and the explosion of public and official opinion, over what was seen as Japan's whitewashing of its colonial past in new textbooks adopted for use in Japanese high schools, is a striking example of how deeply felt some anti-Japanese feelings remain. While there is much interest in Japan, especially among younger Koreans who are fascinated by Japanese pop culture, historical memories linger on.

5. China and Russia: Opportunity or Threat?
The emergence of China as a major global player is one of the signal developments of our era. So too has been the collapse of the Soviet Union, and efforts by Russia to reestablish its global presence. With these factors in mind, we put a pair of questions to our respondents:

"Do you think of [China/Russia] as primarily a market and economic opportunity, or primarily a potential military threat, with expansionist interests toward Korea?"

China is seen - overwhelmingly - as an economic opportunity. That view was unanimous among respondents from politics, government and public life, academia, and media and the press. Only the military did not share this view so broadly, split between "opportunity" and "threat."

This helps to explain the high hopes concerning China, reported earlier on two key factors:

• an optimistic prediction of the direction of future Korea-China ties (with an 86-14% balance expecting them to be "closer" rather than "unchanged"), and;
• the comparative importance of future ties between Korea and China, on one hand, and Korea and the United States, on the other (with a significant 53-41% majority balance putting ties with China first).

Overall, our survey underscores the high level of interest and anticipation that many place in the potential for future ROK-China ties. That reassessed potential carries distinct implications for ties between Seoul and Washington. The tectonic plates appear to be shifting, a factor that must be calibrated into assessments of the shape of Korean policy, and the course of U.S.-Korean ties. U.S. policies that Koreans find objectionable (tariffs on steel imports, to cite a recent example) will serve to enhance the attractiveness of China and the Chinese market.

With Russia, a more ambivalent assessment emerges. While a majority also saw commercial opportunity, a larger minority worried about military threat. This is in keeping with tempered views about Russia noted earlier:

• more restrained assessments of future Korea-Russia ties (with 47-45% balance expecting them to be "unchanged" rather than "closer"), and;
• the comparative importance of future ties between Korea and Russia, on one hand, and Korea and the United States, on the other (with a 8-92% balance, unequivocally putting ties with the United States first).