|
| |||
|
AsiaTODAY latest news stories AskASIA educational resource AsiaFOOD Asian food resource AsiaSTORE online bookstore AsiaPROFILES maps & statistics AsiaVIEWS articles & speeches AsiaLINKS related links AsiaEXPERTS specialists database AsiaEVENTS worldwide calendar AsiainNYC cultural travel guide AsiaBULLETIN email updates
|
![]() Mossadegh, Mohammed (1881-1967) The Encyclopedia of Asian History the Asia Society 1988. Mossadegh, Mohammed (1881-1967), an Iranian political leader best known for his role, during his tenure as prime minister, in the oil nationalization crisis of 1951-1953. Mossadegh led the National Front (Jebhe-ye Melli), a coalition of secular and religious political groups that was one of the most important forces opposing the Pahlavi monarchy. Born into a wealthy, landed family, Mossadegh was educated at the Ecole des Sciences Politiques in Paris and at Neuchatel University in Switzerland. He held various government positions from an early age, serving as a member of the Iranian Majles (parliament) from 1915 to 1917, again from 1925 to 1928, and finally from 1944 to 1953. Under the last of the Qajar monarchs, Mossadegh served as governor-general of the province of Fars (1920-1921), as minister of justice (1921), as governor-general of Azerbaijan (1922-1923), and as foreign minister (1924). Mossadegh's support for constitutionalism and parliamentary democracy, coupled with his opposition to Reza Shah's increasing autocracy, led to his arrest in the late 1930s and temporary retirement from political life. He reentered the political arena in 1941 immediately following the forced abdication and exile of Reza Shah by the British. It was in this period, from 1941 to 1943, that Mossadegh arose as the leader and spokesman for the secular nationalist faction of the Majles that was to become the National Front. Elected to the fourteenth Majles in 1943, Mossadegh spoke out strongly in opposition to continued foreign influence in Iran's government and economy, most specifically in the area of the already crucial oil industry. Mossadegh made frequent, sometimes impassioned speeches in the Majles concerning the disadvantageous concessions Iran had often made to foreign interests. He proposed a bill, passed in December 1944, prohibiting any minister from negotiating oil concessions to a foreign party without the approval of the Majles. Three years later, he led the successful opposition to a proposed joint Soviet-Iranian venture to search for oil in northern Iran. Simultaneously, Mossadegh challenged the terms of the current agreement with the British in their oil concession in the south; this move quickly developed into a call for complete nationalization of Iran's oil industry. From 1947 to 1949 Iran's government engaged in negotiations for new terms for the oil concession granted to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC); these ended in a highly unpopular compromise agreement that was accepted by the government but rejected by the Majles. Mossadegh and the National Front led the opposition to the oil agreement, and the Majles elections of 1950, in which the National Front candidates gained a large number of new seats, reflected the growing popular support for the anti-British, nationalist position long held by Mossadegh. With his election as chairman of the oil commission of the Majles, Mossadegh immediately reiterated the call for nationalization of the oil industry. In 1951, after the assassination of Ali Razmara and a brief interim government led by Husain Ala, Mossadegh was elected prime minister. Under his premiership, Iran formally announced the nationalization of the oil industry. The ensuing dispute between Iran and Great Britain led to a worldwide boycott of purchases of Iranian oil, with the United States initially supporting, then actively opposing, Iran's position. Great Britain interfered with Iran's foreign trade and banking and put diplomatic pressure on its allies to do the same. The United States, responding to repeated British requests, refused to lend Iran money until the oil dispute was resolved; at the same time the Americans made their own efforts to enforce the international oil boycott. Consequently, from 1951 to 1953 Iran experienced a severe economic decline with only small sales of oil to Japan and Italy, which resisted pressure to join the boycott. The overwhelming importance of oil revenues to Iran's economy, together with the successful efforts of Great Britain and the United States to block foreign loans or new markets for Iran's oil, presented insurmountable stumbling blocks to Mossadegh's political and economic policies. During his tenure, and in the midst of the oil crisis, Mossadegh attempted to reduce Iran's dependence on oil revenues, to reform the domestic tax and revenue structures, and to control government spending. He also sought a policy of nonalignment in foreign affairs, hoping to balance off the Soviet Union and the Western powers. Within Iran, Mossadegh enjoyed widespread support throughout most of 1952; early 1953, however, he was faced with a deepening economic crisis and the defection from the National Front of Husain Makki, Muzaffar Baghai, and the religious faction led by Ayatollah Kashani. Iran's major communist party, the Tudeh, initially supported then later attacked Mossadegh's leadership; Mossadegh, in turn, was cautious about accepting support from the Tudeh party, in part because of its pro-Soviet stance. In addition, conflicts with the shah had led to a series of demonstrations in support of Mossadegh following arrests of various government officials on charges of treason and conspiracy. Mossadegh's most serious internal opposition stemmed from growing disputes within the National Front. Once he had consolidated control of the government, after pressures that had held the National Front together were relaxed, some religious and leftist groups found themselves at odds with Mossadegh's policies. A number of social, economic, and political reforms that Mossadegh wished to implement alienated one group or another, and a growing sense of impatience and then alarm was expressed by some over Mossadegh's attempts at gaining control of the army, something he felt he had to have to ensure the stability of his government. By the summer of 1953, the British and American governments had initiated plans for the covert overthrow of Mossadegh. British Intelligence and the United States Central Intelligence Agency had agreed to support the shah and opposition groups within Iran in carrying out a coup. The decision was made to replace Mossadegh with General Fazlollah Zahedi, one of those arrested in February on charges of plotting to overthrow the government. The shah and a group of military officers were informed of these plans, and they were put into effect in August. On 19 August a group of tanks led by General Zahedi moved through Tehran and surrounded Mossadegh's residence. At the same time, hired strongmen from the bazaar commenced a noisy demonstration in support of the shah, while supporters of Ayatollah Kashani joined in to add to the confusion. Resistance to the coup was minimal, and in a matter of hours both Mossadegh and his top leaders were arrested and the shah was flying back to Iran, Several months later Mossadegh was put on trial for treason, he spent three years in jail and then was confined to his village, in political isolation until his death in 1967. Mossadegh remains a figure of tremendous stature in the history of modern Iran. As an
individual he had a reputation for honesty, integrity, and sincerity. He strongly opposed
foreign, especially British and, later, American, influence in Iran at the time when most
Iranians perceived many of their economic and political hardships as originating from such
influence. He was an eloquent, impassioned orator, and his speeches are still widely read
in Iran.
Copyright © . Asia Society. All rights reserved. Please click here for legal restrictions and terms of use applicable to this site and Asia Society's Privacy Policy. |