Thereafter, during the Kargil War of 1999 in many ways a defining moment in Sino-Pak ties, the Chinese were very subdued and refrained from making any public statements in support of Pakistan. This was in spite of India's ill-considered remarks on China as the cause of its going overtly nuclear in May 1998. Echoing Jiang Zemin, the Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji told his visiting Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif in June 1999 that the Kashmir problem is "an issue left over from history concerning territory, ethnic nationalities and religion". Hence, the "rebuke with Chinese characteristics" that General Mushrraf received is part of an emerging pattern. Chinese scholars and diplomats like Cheng Ruisheng writing in Chinese publications repeatedly invoke the "Deng" formula to stabilize Indo-Pak relations. This was the formula suggested by Deng Xiaoping to Atal Bihari Vajpayee in February 1979 and to Rajiv Gandhi in December 1988 to bring India and China closer together-set intractable issues aside, keep negotiating on them in good faith but simultaneously concentrate on trade and investment. The Chinese are at great pains to appear even-handed in the sub-continent. The unprecedented joint Sino-Indian naval exercises last month off Shanghai, for instance, were preceded by a similar Sino-Pak manoueuvre.

Why are the Chinese changing? Three main reasons. First, they are being hurt considerably by Islamic terrorism in Xinjiang where Uighur separatists trained by the Taliban and by Pakistan-based outfits are very active. Xinjiang is important to China not just geographically as a gateway to Central Asia but also economically since it is rich in natural resources like oil and gas. The three evils as the Chinese call it---extremism, separatism and terrorism-are linked closely to Pakistan. Second, India itself looms large on China's radar screen. Already, the volume of Sino-Indian trade is over three and a half times the volume of Sino-Pak trade. But much more than growing trade and investment, the Chinese have newfound respect for India because of our success in software and high-tech. The Chinese would not like to sabotage a promising arena of economic cooperation, even if there is competition. Third, changing Sino-Pak ties symbolize a new Chinese approach to regional and global diplomacy, an approach that seeks to make up for its historical commitment to narco-militarist states like Pakistan, North Korea and Myanmar and to assuage "fears" of its galloping economic might.

China is not about to abandon Pakistan after having helped it build up a comprehensive strategic capability through the 1980s that included supply of heavy water, assistance for research reactors, plutonium reprocessing and uranium and transfer of missile production technology as well as supply of missiles themselves. Whatever China's protestations may be now, the evidence for its support to Pakistan in nuclear and missile technology is incontrovertible. This support has ended strategic links remain. Just last month, an agreement was signed for a second 300 Mw nuclear reactor at Chashma southwest of Islamabad. Plans for building a deep-water port at Gwadar off the coast of Baluchistan are still active, although with the palpable US influence over Pakistan now, how the plans actually fructify remains to be seen.

China's foreign policy is in great flux. It is all part of a single-minded focus on economic development oriented to making China an economic superpower in every respect (except, perhaps per capita income) in the next two decades. China realizes that peace in its region-East Asia, South Asia and Central Asia-is essential for sustaining such a unidirectional effort. It is all part of the new PRC syndrome-not the old Peoples Republic of China but a new Peaceful Rise of China. The Chinese establishment's mantra is heping jueqi-peaceful ascendancy. The new PRC will not be facilitated if it is seen to be extending support to forces ostracized by the international community. What the Chinese will do when they achieve overwhelming economic dominance is a separate issue. But for now, the substance is economics, the language is peace and stability, the style is constructive diplomacy. Economic clout and military muscle notwithstanding or perhaps precisely because of that, the Chinese want to be seen an good neighbours and sober citizens of the world. But there are two big question marks. Economic success is breeding aggressive nationalism that could easily run amok. And Taiwan's politics can still get the Chinese into apoplectic fits as recent events have demonstrated and this, in turn, fuels global fears of China.